Hi Dr. Chua,

Maybe You like to change the font colour from yellow to something
darker? Can't see very clear.

Thanks!
Daniel

--- In hapkidoflyingeagle@yahoogroups.com, "Dennis Chua"
<hbchua@p...> wrote:
>
> Marine Corps GazetteHere's a good article on why Koreans are good
in martial arts.It's more than technique.It is martial spirit.
> The writer of this article also took some information from
Grandmaster He-Young Kimm's research on Taekwondo to place into his
article below.
> Notes no.3. He Young Kimm, "General Choi Hong Hi: A Tae Kwon Do
History Lesson," Tae Kwon Do Times, January 2000,
>
> In Hanmudo Founder Dr.He-Young Kimm's research, early Korean
ancestors migrated from the cold Central Asia,crossed the Altai
mountain in northern asia down into the Korean peninsula,where the
climate was warmer.They had to fight their way thru.Even when they
settled in the Korean peniinsula,they had to ward off both Chinese
and Japanese invasion.Today, South Korea technically is in a state
of war with the North.That's why they still have a martial spirit
for survival.
> Here's an interesting account of the modern Korean warrior in
Vietnam.See below.
> Grandmaster Dr. Kimm ,himself a lieutenant in the Korean
Marines ,taught the 8th US Army in Korea in the 1950's.He told me
warfare martial art is different.Taking a brick to crack an enemies
skull is good Hapkido in the army!
>
> Before we get too carried away with the sporting aspects of
martial arts, we should not forget that martial art training is to
develop a good martial spirit to see us through life's challenges.
>
> Here's a snippet from the article
> "The role of martial arts training in the battle has been a topic
of discussion for nearly four decades. At the press conference
following the battle, Capt Jung was adamant in his opinion that tae
kwon do contributed greatly to the combat abilities and fighting
spirit of the Korean Marines, both enlisted and officers.24 In a
graphic description, Time noted that martial arts training was
critical to the victory:
>
>
> It was knife to knife and hand-to-hand-and in that sort of
fighting the Koreans, with their deadly tae kwon do (a form of
karate), are unbeatable. When the action stopped shortly after dawn,
104 enemy bodies lay within the wire, many of them eviscerated or
brained.25"
>
> Asked to provide their opinions for this article, both Taeguk
Medal recipients stated that martial arts training significantly
contributed to the Marines' victory. LtCol Jung, now retired and
living in Seoul, emphasized two areas in which tae kwon do
influenced his Marines:
>
>
> First, the enemy suddenly overwhelmed our trenches and
continuously piled up to the degree that we were unable to use
rifles and bayonets as weapons. There were many instances in which
we were pushing and pulling each other inside the trenches. At that
time, Tae Kwon Do became the Korean Marines' weapon and by hitting
the enemy in his vital parts, we brought him under our control.
>
>
> Second, it can be seen that the courage to be unafraid when
facing your enemy was trained through Tae Kwon Do. Although we
didn't have a path of retreat and had to stay in our position, the
fortitude to fight bravely while exposed to the enemy led to victory
at the Battle of Tra Binh Dong.26
>
>
> Retired MajGen Shin Won Bae, who later commanded the Blue Dragon
unit (now the 2d ROK Marine Division) provided similar insights,
noting:
>
>
> Even though tactics call for fixing bayonets to rifles during
close quarters to neutralize the enemy, our weapon at the time, the
M-1 rifle, was not a weapon that could be wielded quickly. In urgent
situations, the Marine in the front would fiercely strike the
enemy's face and vital parts using Tae Kwon Do, causing him to
momentarily lose his will to fight. Then a second Marine would
finish off the enemy with the rifle. Additionally, striking the
enemy with an entrenching tool was highly effective in destroying
the will to fight among the enemy's lead elements. While Tae Kwon Do
demonstrated its practical effectiveness on the battlefield, more
importantly, martial arts training instilled the confidence to
defeat the enemy in each Marine. I think this is the greater
significance of Tae Kwon Do training.27
>
>
>
> Regards
> DrChua
> Hanmudo Assn Singapore
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> The Battle of Tra Binh Dong and the Korean Origins of the
U.S. Marine Corps Martial Arts Program
>
> by LtCol James F. Durand
>
> Lasting impressions of Korean Marines' martial arts skills
led to the establishment of the MCMAP.
>
>
> In establishing the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program
(MCMAP), Gen James L. Jones frequently recounted his observations of
Korean Marines during the Vietnam War. The fact that Republic of
Korea (ROK) servicemen were skilled in the Korean martial art tae
kwon do was widely known, evoking respect among allies and
instilling fear in the enemy. The former Commandant recalled that
his own Marines envied this skill, believing the Korean Marines were
the most feared adversary on the battlefield and that North
Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong irregulars would bypass Korean
units whenever possible.
>
>
> Despite a long and rich martial arts history, the Korean
martial arts program was in its relative infancy at the time of the
Vietnam War; tae kwon do had yet to achieve its current status as a
national pastime or an international sport. Nonetheless, tae kwon do
was a martial art in the truest sense of the word, developed by a
soldier to enhance the fighting abilities of his soldiers. By the
time the first servicemen deployed to Vietnam, all branches of the
Korean military had implemented martial arts training programs.
Moreover, it was in Vietnam that the value of martial arts training
in combat operations was conclusively demonstrated. Accordingly, the
history of tae kwon do in the Korean Armed Forces provides valuable
insight to American Marines as the MCMAP enters its fifth year.
>
>
>
> Overhead view of Tra Binh Dong.
> Photo courtesy of the ROKMC Headquarters.
> MG Choi Hong Hi-The Father of Tae Kwon Do
> Although Koreans had practiced martial arts for centuries,
using both indigenous arts and styles borrowed from Japan and China,
Korea's martial artists faced serious challenges during the Japanese
occupation. Fearing the consequences of a populace skilled in
martial arts, the Japanese Colonial Government banned the teaching
and practice of martial arts in Korea in 1909.1 Despite the ban,
Koreans continued to learn tae kyon, karate, or kenjo through secret
instruction or service in the Japanese military. Army GEN Choi Hong
Hi followed both paths and, in the process, developed a new art that
would forever change military training and international sport.2
>
>
> As a boy, Choi's father sent him to study calligraphy and
Chinese classics in hopes that his son might earn a living carving
tombstones. From his calligraphy teacher, he secretly learned tae
kyun, Korea's indigenous martial art that emphasizes fighting with
one's feet. At age 21, Choi moved to Japan to further his education
and studied karate, earning a second- degree black belt. Conscripted
into the Japanese Army, he was sent to Korea for duty, where he and
other Korean soldiers planned to desert the Imperial Army and join
the Korean Restoration Army in order to fight the Japanese. When
Choi's plans were discovered, he was sent to prison and was within
days of being executed when the Japanese surrendered and Korea was
liberated.
>
>
> Following his release from prison, Choi journeyed to Seoul
and was among the first group of officers to join the newly
established ROK Army. He rose through the ranks quickly and was
given several commands. At each level of command, Choi instructed
his soldiers in the techniques of unarmed combat, proving that
martial arts could be taught on a large scale. By the end of the
Korean War, Choi had become a general officer and was tasked with
forming the final division that would be created during the
conflict. The 29th Division, also known as the "Fist Division," was
unique in that all soldiers had been trained in martial arts and
were "ready to fight with or without weapons."3
>
>
> While commanding the Fist Division, Choi advocated martial
arts training for all servicemen. GEN Choi arranged for a
demonstration for Korean President Syngman Rhee in order to secure
backing for his initiative. The President was impressed-particularly
after witnessing a master break 13 roofing tiles with a single
strike-and directed that all soldiers receive martial arts training.4
>
>
> Despite President Rhee's endorsement, MG Choi faced many
obstacles in implementing his plans. The new program had to compete
with traditional combat skills training-marksmanship and physical
fitness training-as well as established fighting programs. The
Service academies, modeled on their American counterparts, were
teaching boxing.5 Because the 29th Division was stationed on Cheju
Island, far from the frontlines, MG Choi was never able to show the
benefits of martial arts training in combat. Consequently, many
general officers were skeptical of the alleged benefits and critical
of his activities.6
>
>
> Even among advocates of martial arts training, there was no
consensus that the style advocated by GEN Choi was the best.
Following liberation from Japan, there had been a resurgence in the
teaching and practice of martial arts, and no less than 17 forms
existed at the time of the Korean War.7 The issue of standardizing
the forms was resolved at a meeting in April 1955 between now-MG
Choi and the leaders of each of the major styles of martial arts.
During this meeting MG Choi persuaded the other masters to adopt his
style and the Korean Tae Kwon Do Association was formed.
>
>
> MG Choi continued to advocate martial arts training for all
servicemen. Assigned to the Army Staff in 1959, he created the
Division of Martial Arts Training and was appointed its first
director.8 In this capacity, MG Choi led demonstration teams on
visits to Taiwan and the Republic of Vietnam in 1959. South
Vietnamese military officials were so impressed with the
demonstration that they requested the Korean Government send tae
kwon do instructors to Vietnam to institute a similar program there.
Four Korean instructors taught 50 Vietnamese servicemen during 1962-
63.9
>
>
> Political and personal rivalries threatened MG Choi's
initiatives when Army MG Park Chung Hee seized power in a coup on 16
May 1961. Park ordered the popular general into retirement and sent
him abroad as the Korean Ambassador to Malaysia in 1962. MG Choi
remained a tireless advocate of tae kwon do, sponsoring and leading
exhibitions in Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries. He
revised the forms for tae kwon do and began writing an English
language textbook. While serving in Malaysia, Choi traveled to
Vietnam and, on the roof of his hotel, met with the Korean
instructors and taught them the new forms. He directed that his
changes be taught to soldiers in both Korea and Vietnam.
>
>
>
> LtGen Louis W. Walt, Commanding General (CG), III MAF,
speaks with Capt Jung, Commanding Officer, 11th Company, the morning
following the battle, surrounded by BGen Kim Young Sang, CG, 2d ROK
Marine Brigade, and other senior Marines.
> Photo courtesy of the Vietnam Veterans of Korea.
> Tae Kwon Do in the Vietnam War
> In response to appeals for international support, the Korean
Government dispatched 10 tae kwon do instructors and a mobile Army
surgical hospital to South Vietnam on 13 September 1964, the first
increments of Seoul's lengthy and significant commitment to the
Republic of Vietnam.10 The instructors taught South Vietnamese
servicemen from all military Services. The tae kwon do detachment
would be the longest serving unit in Vietnam-by 1973, 647 tae kwon
do instructors had served in Vietnam.11 The arrival of combat forces
in 1965 would further demonstrate the value of martial arts training
by friend and foe alike.
>
>
> The first commander of ROK Forces Vietnam, Army LTG Jae
Myung Shin, was an early pupil of MG Choi, earning a fifth-degree
black belt.12 A devoted practitioner of tae kwon do, he practiced 30
minutes daily, and visitors were apt to find the general leading his
entire staff in martial arts training in front of his
headquarters.13 Similar activities occurred at the headquarters of
the Capital and White Horse Divisions and the Blue Dragon Brigade.
>
>
> The knowledge of the Korean's martial arts prowess, fueled
by frequent unit-wide demonstrations, quickly spread to allies and
adversaries. Allied servicemen envied this skill, believing that the
Koreans were the most feared opponent on the battlefield. Captured
enemy documents confirmed this suspicion. Viet Cong commanders
ordered their troops to avoid contact with the Koreans "at all
costs, unless a Viet Cong victory is 100% certain."14 Should they
come into contact, the Viet Cong were advised to retreat rather than
fight.15
>
>
> Because the Viet Cong were hesitant to engage them, the
Korean units were able to restore stability within their assigned
areas of responsibility. By 1966, 8 months after the Capital
Division arrived, the Tigers had secured the port of Qui Nhon and
Highways 1 and 19 in Binh Dinh Province, a feat that neither the
South Vietnamese nor the French had been able to accomplish in over
20 years.16 And the actions of a single company of Marines from the
Blue Dragon Brigade would make a small hamlet at Tra Binh Dong a
place that would become synonymous with Korean military and martial
arts prowess.
>
>
> The Battle of Tra Binh Dong17
> In early February 1967, North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
commanders took advantage of the truce following the Tet holiday to
begin preparations for a major attack. The 2d NVA Division
infiltrated into the coastal lowlands of the Quang Ngai Province.
Using elephants to transport 120mm mortars, the division assembled a
regimental-sized force composed of two battalions from the 1st and
21st Regiments and a battalion of Viet Cong guerrillas in order to
attack the city of Quang Ngai and the U.S. Marine base at Chu Lai.
Built at the direction of LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Commanding
General, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, the base was a critical
aviation and logistics center that supported operations across the I
Corps tactical zone.18 The airbase was home to nine fixed-wing
squadrons assigned to Marine Aviation Group 12 (MAG-12) and MAG-13,
the 1st Service and 9th Engineer Support Battalions, and the 1st
Hospital Company.19
>
>
> The 2d ROK Marine Brigade had been assigned a tactical area
of operations within the Chu Lai region since August 1966. Although
the Blue Dragons were not under the command of III Marine Amphibious
Force (III MAF), Korean and American Marines coordinated their
actions in defense of the base. The Blue Dragon Brigade was
organized around three infantry battalions supported by a composite
(105mm and 155mm) artillery battalion, heavy mortar company, an
aviation detachment, and headquarters, service, medical, and
security companies.
>
>
> The 3d Battalion's 11th Company was assigned near the
village of Tra Binh Dong. Capt Jung Kyung Jin, a graduate of the
Korean Naval Academy's 15th Class (1961), commanded 294 Marines
positioned in a clearing atop a small hill on the outskirts of the
village. Within the 300- by 200-meter heart-shaped perimeter, the
Marines built trenches connecting their fighting positions, mortar
pits, and command posts. Barbed wire and claymore mines surrounded
the trenches, and heavy and light machineguns were interspersed
throughout the perimeter. Capt Jung's company was reinforced with a
section of 4.2-inch mortars, a communications detachment, and
supported by the brigade's 105mm and 155mm artillery batteries.
>
>
> On 14 February 1967, at approximately 2320, an enemy force
approached the company's perimeter from the west. A Marine in the
observation post detected the movement and reported back to the 3d
Platoon. Capt Jung quickly placed the company on alert. He waited
until the platoon-sized unit closed to within 5 meters of the
company's perimeter before ordering his Marines to fire. Flares lit
up the sky, revealing one corpse tangled in the wire and the
remaining Vietnamese withdrawing to the tree line. Believing that
the objective of this attack was to test the Marines' defense, Capt
Jung immediately prepared his company for the larger attack that
would surely follow, assigning additional Marines to the listening
posts, reapportioning ammunition, checking crew-served weapons, and
reviewing fire support plans. Using the call sign "Seoul," Capt Jung
ordered his platoon commanders to remain vigilant throughout the
night.
>
>
> At 0410, approximately 2,400 North Vietnamese soldiers began
their attack on the 11th Company with an intense barrage of mortar
and recoilless rifle fire. One battalion advanced from the
southeast, blowing whistles, beating drums, and screaming "Tai Han
ra di, ra di" (come out Koreans) as they advanced on the 1st
Platoon's position. Two minutes later, two more battalions attacked
from the north to the 3d Platoon's sector. The Marines immediately
responded with rifle and machinegun fire. Under attack from two
directions, Capt Jung ordered the weapons platoon commander to
direct fires from the company's mortars and provide a situation
report to the battalion commander, while telling the forward
observer to begin coordinating artillery support from the brigade's
105mm and 155mm batteries. Clad in a running shirt under his flak
jacket, Capt Jung moved about the company's perimeter, assessing the
situation and encouraging his Marines. Despite the intensity of
direct and indirect fire weapons and claymore mines, the North
Vietnamese continued to advance upon the company's position,
attacking in human waves.
>
>
>
> Newspaper headlines about the battle. All major Korean
and English language papers, including the Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo,
Seoul Shinmun, Korea Herald, and Pacific Stars and Stripes, gave
front page cover to accounts of the battle.
> Photo courtesy of ROKMC Headquarters.
> Rearmed and reequipped, the third wave of the assault
attacked the 3d Platoon's position and destroyed the protective wire
with Bangalore torpedoes. Led by soldiers armed with rocket
propelled grenades and flamethrowers, the North Vietnamese attempted
to infiltrate a platoon into the breach at approximately 0422. SSgt
Bae Jang Choon's 1st Squad bore the brunt of the assault. Despite a
serious wound to his right shoulder, SSgt Bae refused to abandon his
position, ordering his Marines to stand their ground and prepare for
hand-to-hand combat. The fighting shifted from rifles to grenades as
North Vietnamese commanders continued to push soldiers into the
breach. Entrenching tools, pix axes, and fists became the Marines'
weapons when the North Vietnamese entered the trenches.
>
>
> In the face of an overwhelming and relentless enemy, the
actions of the squad were characterized by tenacity and
selflessness. PFC Kim Myoug Deok killed 10 enemy soldiers with his
automatic rifle as they crawled toward his position. Despite serious
injuries received from hand-to-hand combat, Sgt Lee Hak Won took
handgrenades in both hands, waited for the enemy to draw near, and
detonated the grenades in a suicide attack that killed himself and
four Vietnamese soldiers. PFC Lee Young Bok, who was the only member
of the squad not to have been killed or injured at this point, lured
the enemy toward his position, disappeared into a spider hole, then
released several grenades as the soldiers entered the trench,
temporarily obstructing the attack.
>
>
> In the 1st Platoon sector, the North Vietnamese set up a
mortar firing point that was now firing upon the company command
post. 2dLt Shin Won Bae, 1st Platoon commander, immediately
assembled an assault force to destroy the mortar position, located
behind a group of rocks approximately 100 meters in front of his
platoon's position. Ordering his squad leaders to provide covering
fire, 2dLt Shin and his platoon sergeant, GySgt Kim Yong Kil, led a
fire team toward the rocks amidst constant enemy fire. When they
closed to within 20 meters of the objective, GySgt Kim threw two
handgrenades toward the hidden enemy. At the instant the grenades
exploded, the Marines moved forward, repeating this tactic until
they reached the rocks. Twenty dead soldiers surrounded the three
menacing tubes, which the Marines quickly seized and withdrew to the
platoon's position.
>
>
> On the other side of the perimeter, the entire 3d Platoon
was engaged in hand-to-hand combat as they fought to hold their
position against the Vietnamese attack. Discovering two soldiers
attempting to take the Marines' 60mm mortars from the mortar pit,
PFC Lee Ki On struck both in the face with the butt of his pistol,
recovered the mortars, then killed the pair with a handgrenade. As
two Marines fought enemy soldiers within the confines of the 4.2-
inch mortar pit, a North Vietnamese armed with a flamethrower
advanced on the pit, spewing flames. PFCs Kim Bo Hyun and Yung Sang
Yul dashed toward the enemy under cover of friendly fire, attacked
the flamethrower with grenades in a spectacular explosion, and
seized one light machinegun.
>
>
> The North Vietnamese attempted the same tactic against the
1st Platoon, sending soldiers armed with two flamethrowers into the
breach in the platoon's lines. 2dLt Shin and SSgt Oh Sung Hwan
dashed toward the flames. Firing machineguns and throwing
handgrenades, the two Marines killed the soldiers, seized the Soviet-
made flamethrowers, and rallied the platoon to restore the
perimeter.
>
>
> Two hours into the attack, the Marines faced a grave
situation. The North Vietnamese continued to attack from two
directions, had breached the perimeter at both points of attack, and
now held approximately one-third of the company's position.
Believing that his position might be overrun, Capt Jung considered
calling for a napalm strike on his own position from U.S. Marine
Corps aircraft on station.20 However, the thick fog and rain made
visibility so poor that even this desperate measure was not an
option. More significantly, the ferocity of the enemy attack began
to falter in the face of the desperate resistance by the 3d Platoon
Marines. Capt Jung ordered the 2d Platoon commander to provide one
squad to 3d Platoon to assist them in their fight.
>
>
> At 0630 1stLt Kim Se Chang, the forward observer attached to
the company, determined the likely location of the regimental
command post and began directing fires from the brigade's 105mm
howitzers against it. The Blue Dragon artillerymen responded with
devastating fires that soon crippled the enemy's ability to direct
the attack. His assistant, SSgt Kim Hyun Chul, refused to take the
binoculars from his eyes despite intense small arms fire as he
scanned the trees in search of the enemy's mortars. Locating the
enemy 61mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars, he reported their locations to
his lieutenant who quickly passed them along to the fire direction
center. The Marine artillery quickly overwhelmed the enemy mortars.
>
>
> Isolated from their commander and lacking fire support, the
North Vietnamese attack began to falter as casualties rapidly
mounted. Capt Jung then made what would be the critical decision of
the battle-assembling a squad-sized counterattack force from the 1st
and 2d Platoons and ordering it into the breach to isolate the North
Vietnamese soldiers within the perimeter. 1stLt Kim Ki Hong, the
weapons platoon commander, volunteered to lead the Marines in a
daring and courageous counterattack. As the 3d Platoon Marines and
North Vietnamese soldiers engaged in hand-to-hand combat in the
trenches immediately below the company's observation post, 1stLt Kim
led his squad in a double envelopment of the North Vietnamese within
the perimeter beginning at 0652. The lieutenant quickly killed five
enemy soldiers with his pistol and began pushing the enemy back into
the breach. Encouraged and emboldened by the attack, SSgt Kim Son
Kwan, the 3d Platoon platoon sergeant, led his Marines in joining
the assault, shouting and using whatever weapon was available to
strike the enemy. With the North Vietnamese surrounded by the
assault force, it was the Koreans turn to shout "ra di, ra di." The
North Vietnamese refused calls to surrender and continued a
desperate resistance, only to be shot to death by the Marines.
>
>
> The soldiers who managed to escape the Marines linked up
with North Vietnamese support units. In order to lure the company-
sized force toward the Marine position, at 0724 Capt Jung ordered
the 3d Platoon to destroy its bunkers and withdraw to the company
observation post. 1st and 2d Platoons were directed to envelop the
attackers on order. Sensing victory, the North Vietnamese again
began to beat gongs as they advanced upon the company for a final
time. When they closed to within 80 meters, Capt Jung ordered his
Marines to fire and began coordinating fires from the brigade's
heavy mortar company. Shortly thereafter, the skies cleared and four
U.S. Marine Corps A-4 Skyhawks repeatedly attacked the remaining
Vietnamese force. Helicopters followed the attack aircraft and cut
their path of retreat.
>
>
> At 0800, 16 helicopters carrying the 6th Company, 2d
Battalion arrived from the Blue Dragon Brigade headquarters.
Advancing outward from the protective wire, the Marine
reinforcements began clearing operations. The fleeing North
Vietnamese left the bodies of 243 soldiers behind. An additional 60
soldiers were presumed to have been killed. As a testament to the
ferocity of the battle, over 100 North Vietnamese corpses lay within
the company's perimeter, and 140 bodies lay next to the protective
wire. One of the two prisoners captured during the fighting was a
North Vietnamese battalion commander. The company also captured 3
flamethrowers, 5 antitank rocket launchers, 2 machineguns, 28
rifles, 100 pieces of dynamite, and over 6,000 rounds of ammunition.
The 11th Company lost 15 Marines during the fighting, and 33 were
injured. Following the defeat, the North Vietnamese abandoned plans
for subsequent attacks against the Chu Lai airbase and the city of
Quang Ngai.
>
>
> News of the battle traveled throughout the country and
world. The commanding generals of III MAF and 2d ROK Marine Brigade
went to Tra Binh Dong and met with the 11th Company Marines the
morning of the battle. They were quickly followed by the commanders
of I Corps, ROK Forces Vietnam, and the U.S. Military Assistance
Command Vietnam. After being briefed on the battle, President Park
Chung Hee directed that all enlisted Marines in the 11th Company be
promoted one rank, the first unit-wide promotion since the Korean
War. He also dispatched the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and
Marine Commandant to Vietnam. Defense Minister Kim Sung Eun-the most
storied Marine commander of the Korean War, commander of the only
other unit to be promoted en masse, and former Commandant-promoted
the Marines on behalf of the President.
>
>
> The Korean Government awarded more decorations for the
battle of Tra Binh Dong than any other action of the Vietnam War.
Capt Jung and 2dLt Shin received the Taeguk Medal, Korea's
equivalent of the Medal of Honor; the Korean Government awarded the
medal only 11 times during the war, and Tra Binh Dong was the only
battle for which the medal was awarded to two individuals. GySgt Kim
and SSgt Bae received the Ulchi Medal, Korea's second highest award
for valor; the Chung Mu Medal, the third highest military
decoration, was awarded to 11 Marines. The 11th Company received the
U.S. and ROK Presidential Unit Citations in recognition of
their "effective teamwork, aggressive fighting spirit and many
individual acts of heroism."21
>
>
> Accounts of the battle were carried in media throughout the
world. The New York Times reported the battle as the "South Korean's
greatest victory in their 15 months in South Vietnam."22 Following a
briefing to foreign journalists, the phrase "Myth-Making Marines"
began to appear in the press, continuing the legacy of the "Ghost-
Catching Marines" and "Invincible Marines" of the Korean War.
>
>
>
> Surveying the aftermath of the battle. LtGen Walt and
Capt Jung view the bodies of Viet Cong and NVA soldiers killed
during the Battle of Tra Binh Dong.
> Photo courtesy of ROKMC Headquarters.
> Lessons Learned and Epilogue
> The battle of Tra Binh Dong is studied by military
professionals throughout Korea, and its lessons are taught to all
Marines. The ROK Marine Corps (ROKMC) cites four factors as critical
to the 11th Company's victory: the distinguished combat leadership
of the company and platoon commanders, the hard fighting by all
Marines in the unit, the effective use of fire support, and the
boldness of the counterattack.23
>
>
> The role of martial arts training in the battle has been a
topic of discussion for nearly four decades. At the press conference
following the battle, Capt Jung was adamant in his opinion that tae
kwon do contributed greatly to the combat abilities and fighting
spirit of the Korean Marines, both enlisted and officers.24 In a
graphic description, Time noted that martial arts training was
critical to the victory:
>
>
> It was knife to knife and hand-to-hand-and in that sort of
fighting the Koreans, with their deadly tae kwon do (a form of
karate), are unbeatable. When the action stopped shortly after dawn,
104 enemy bodies lay within the wire, many of them eviscerated or
brained.25
>
>
> Asked to provide their opinions for this article, both
Taeguk Medal recipients stated that martial arts training
significantly contributed to the Marines' victory. LtCol Jung, now
retired and living in Seoul, emphasized two areas in which tae kwon
do influenced his Marines:
>
>
> First, the enemy suddenly overwhelmed our trenches and
continuously piled up to the degree that we were unable to use
rifles and bayonets as weapons. There were many instances in which
we were pushing and pulling each other inside the trenches. At that
time, Tae Kwon Do became the Korean Marines' weapon and by hitting
the enemy in his vital parts, we brought him under our control.
>
>
> Second, it can be seen that the courage to be unafraid
when facing your enemy was trained through Tae Kwon Do. Although we
didn't have a path of retreat and had to stay in our position, the
fortitude to fight bravely while exposed to the enemy led to victory
at the Battle of Tra Binh Dong.26
>
>
> Retired MajGen Shin Won Bae, who later commanded the Blue
Dragon unit (now the 2d ROK Marine Division) provided similar
insights, noting:
>
>
> Even though tactics call for fixing bayonets to rifles
during close quarters to neutralize the enemy, our weapon at the
time, the M-1 rifle, was not a weapon that could be wielded quickly.
In urgent situations, the Marine in the front would fiercely strike
the enemy's face and vital parts using Tae Kwon Do, causing him to
momentarily lose his will to fight. Then a second Marine would
finish off the enemy with the rifle. Additionally, striking the
enemy with an entrenching tool was highly effective in destroying
the will to fight among the enemy's lead elements. While Tae Kwon Do
demonstrated its practical effectiveness on the battlefield, more
importantly, martial arts training instilled the confidence to
defeat the enemy in each Marine. I think this is the greater
significance of Tae Kwon Do training.27
>
>
> Yet LtCol Jung is careful to emphasize the importance of
fire support in the battle, noting that the artillery and mortar
fires prevented the North Vietnamese from sending reinforcements to
the troops engaged with the Korean Marines.28
>
>
> As if to underscore the strength of the ROKMC Martial Arts
Program, the Korean Marine team won the National Tae Kwon Do
Championship in November 1967, the same year as the battle of Tra
Binh Dong.29 The following year ROKMC headquarters began to include
tae kwon do with marksmanship qualification and physical fitness
testing as measures of combat readiness. (Tae kwon do is now part of
the ROKMC physical fitness test.)30 Despite the demonstrated success
of the martial arts program, both the Marine Corps and Army
continued to experiment with new styles and techniques. The Marines
developed mu chuk do, a more lethal form of tae kwon do. However,
after teaching this form throughout the Corps for several years, the
Marines reverted to tae kwon do as the standard, reserving mu chuk
do for Marines assigned to reconnaissance units.31 Similarly,
Special forces units practice tu kong moo sul, while tae kwon do
remains the standard for the ROK Army.32
>
>
> For American Marines, the early history of the Korean
martial arts program and the battle of Tra Binh Dong provide four
important lessons. First, developing and instituting the program
took time and required the dedicated efforts of senior leaders and
commanders. It took over a decade from the first demonstrations to
the adoption of training objectives and standards. Second, because
many of the program's initial benefits were psychological, they were
difficult to measure. Indeed, it is impossible to quantify how the
confidence and fighting ability of soldiers and Marines were
improved through tae kwon do or the number of times North Vietnamese
or Viet Cong units bypassed Korean units. Third, martial arts
training proved critical in close combat. The ability of the Korean
Marines to prevail against overwhelming odds in hand-to-hand
fighting in the battle of Tra Binh Dong is a testament to the
benefits of tae kwon do training. Lastly, martial arts training is
one of many necessary combat skills. Timely and accurate fire
support, exceptional combat leadership, and countless individual
acts of courage all contributed to the 11th Company's victory.
>
>
> Fifty years after MG Choi began to advocate martial arts
training for Korean soldiers, tae kwon do has grown far beyond its
military roots. It is the national martial art of Korea, practiced
by millions throughout the world, and has been an Olympic medal
sport since 2000. In turn, the growth of tae kwon do as a sport has
further strengthened the Korean military's martial arts program.
Most men entering the military have already received significant
training in some form of martial arts. Because of its focus on
developing the physical skills, combative fitness, and mental
discipline for combat, it is unlikely that the MCMAP will spur a
similar revolution in sport. However, the MCMAP has been an
unqualified success in improving the fighting abilities and warrior
ethos of all Marines. Commenting on its applicability to today's
conflicts, GEN Shin notes, "For the U.S. Marine Corps, which will
encounter battlefields in various countries in the war against
terrorism, Tae Kwon Do training on a regular basis is advisable."33
Whether at bases in their home countries or deployed overseas,
American and Korean Marines continue to train in martial arts,
working to uphold the ideal that Marines are the most respected and
feared adversary on the battlefield.
>
>
> Notes
>
>
> 1. In order to meet military training requirements, the
Japanese Government lifted the ban on martial arts training,
teaching Koreans judo and juken-jutsu (bayonet art) in 1941 and
karate and kung fu in 1943. Dakin Burdick, "People and Events of
T'aekwondo's Formative Years," Journal of Asian Martial Arts, Volume
6, Issue 1, 1997, pp. 30-49, updated and available online in two
parts at http://www.indiana.edu/~iutkd/history/tkdhist.html and "A
History of Taekwondo," copyright 1990, available online at
http://www.indiana.edu/~iutkd/history/dbhistor.html.
>
>
> 2. All names follow the convention of listing the surname
first with the exception of President Syngman Rhee, whose popular
usage dictates otherwise.
>
>
> 3. He Young Kimm, "General Choi Hong Hi: A Tae Kwon Do
History Lesson," Tae Kwon Do Times, January 2000,
> p. 48.
>
>
> 4. Burdick, "People and Events of T'aekwondo's Formative
Years," Part 1, p. 7.
>
>
> 5. Hae Gun Sa Gwan Hak Kyo (Republic of Korea Naval
Academy), Dae Han Min Gook Hae Gun Sa Gwan Hak Kyo 50 Nyun Sa (1946-
1996) (The Fifty Year History of the Republic of Korea Naval Academy
(1946-1996)). Chinhae: ROK Naval Academy, 1996, p. 21. Translations
of this and subsequent Korean sources are by the author.
>
>
> 6. Kimm, p. 49.
>
>
> 7. Dohrenwend, R.E., "Informal History of Chung Do Kwan Tae
Kwon Do," available online at
https://www.sos.mtu.edu/husky/tkdhist.htm.
>
>
> 8. Burdick, "A History of Taekwondo," p. 2.
>
>
> 9. Kimm, p. 53.
>
>
> 10. LTG Larsen, Stanley R. and BG James. L Collins, Jr.,
USA, Allied Participation in Vietnam, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1975, pp. 121-2.
>
>
> 11. Kimm, p. 53.
>
>
> 12. Kimm, p. 51.
>
>
> 13. "South Viet Nam: Other Guns," Time, 22 July 1966, p. 26.
>
>
> 14. Ibid.
>
>
> 15. Kimm, p. 53.
>
>
> 16. Time, July 22, 1966, p. 26.
>
>
> 17. Unless otherwise noted, accounts of the battle are taken
from Tra Binh Dong Chon Tu (ROKMC Won (sic) Great Triumph at Tra
Binh Dong), http://www.vietvet.co.kr. This is the most readable
account of the battle and accurately reflects the events of the
battle contained in the official ROKMC historical accounts.
>
>
> 18. Summers, Jr., COL Harry G., Vietnam War Almanac, Facts
on File Publications, New York, 1985, p. 119.
>
>
> 19. Tefler, Maj Gary L., LtCol Lane Rogers, and V. Keith
Fleming, Jr., U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North
Vietnamese, 1967, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1984, p. 6.
>
>
> 20. Personal letter from LtCol Jung Kyung Jin, ROKMC(Ret) to
the author, dated 29 April 2004.
>
>
> 21. United States Presidential Unit Citation presented to
the 11th Company (Reinforced), 3d Battalion, 2d Republic of Korea
Marine Brigade, 28 May 1968.
>
>
> 22. "Koreans Kill 242 in Vietnam Clash," The New York Times,
16 February 1967, p. 3.
>
>
> 23. Hae Byung Dae Sa Ryoung Bu (ROKMC Headquarters). Hae
Byung Dae Won Haeng Dong Chi Chim Seo (Guidebook for Marines), ROKMC
Headquarters, Seoul, Korea, 1996, p. 29.
>
>
> 24. LtCol Jung letter.
>
>
> 25. "A Savage Week," Time, 24 February 1967, p. 25.
>
>
> 26. LtCol Jung letter.
>
>
> 27. Undated personal letter from MajGen Shin Won Bae, ROKMC
(Ret), received May 2004.
>
>
> 28. LtCol Jung letter.
>
>
> 29. Don Su Choi, Hae Byung Sa (Marine Corps History), Do Seo
Publishing, Seoul, Korea, 1994, p. 64.
>
>
> 30. The Marine Education Base, which oversaw initial
training for officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and enlisted
Marines, initially established an objective of 85 percent of Marines
earning the highest tae kwon do certification. Hae Byung Dae Sa
Ryoung Bu (ROKMC Headquarters), Hae Byung Sa Jae 6 Jip (Marine Corps
History, Volume 6. 1 January 1968 to 31 December 1969), ROKMC
Headquarters, Seoul, Korea, 1971, p. 461.
>
>
> 31. Mu chuk do, the invincible way, takes its name from the
phrase mu chuk hae byung, given to the Marines by President Syngman
Rhee in recognition of their actions at the battle of Mount Do Sol
during the Korean War.
>
>
> 32. Johty, Ben, "The Best of the Best: Korean MacGyvers,"
The Korea Herald, 7 July 2001, pp. 6-7.
>
>
> 33. MG Shin letter.
>
>
> >LtCol Durand is an intelligence officer and East Asia
foreign area officer. He served 5 years in Korea, including
assignments with the Special U.S. Liaison Advisor, Korea; Commander,
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Korea; and the ROK Naval War College. He is
currently a student at Japan's National Institute for Defense
Studies.
>
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