Lasting impressions of Korean Marines’ martial arts skills led to the establishment of the MCMAP.

In establishing the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP), Gen James L. Jones frequently recounted his observations of Korean Marines during the Vietnam War. The fact that Republic of Korea (ROK) servicemen were skilled in the Korean martial art tae kwon do was widely known, evoking respect among allies and instilling fear in the enemy. The former Commandant recalled that his own Marines envied this skill, believing the Korean Marines were the most feared adversary on the battlefield and that North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong irregulars would bypass Korean units whenever possible.

Despite a long and rich martial arts history, the Korean martial arts program was in its relative infancy at the time of the Vietnam War; tae kwon do had yet to achieve its current status as a national pastime or an international sport. Nonetheless, tae kwon do was a martial art in the truest sense of the word, developed by a soldier to enhance the fighting abilities of his soldiers. By the time the first servicemen deployed to Vietnam, all branches of the Korean military had implemented martial arts training programs. Moreover, it was in Vietnam that the value of martial arts training in combat operations was conclusively demonstrated. Accordingly, the history of tae kwon do in the Korean Armed Forces provides valuable insight to American Marines as the MCMAP enters its fifth year.

Overhead view of Tra Binh Dong. Photo courtesy of the ROKMC Headquarters.

MG Choi Hong Hi—The Father of Tae Kwon Do
Although Koreans had practiced martial arts for centuries, using both indigenous arts and styles borrowed from Japan and China, Korea’s martial artists faced serious challenges during the Japanese occupation. Fearing the consequences of a populace skilled in martial arts, the Japanese Colonial Government banned the teaching and practice of martial arts in Korea in 1909.¹ Despite the ban, Koreans continued to learn tae kyon, karate, or kenjo through secret instruction or service in the Japanese military. Army GEN Choi Hong Hi followed both paths and, in the process, developed a new art that would forever change military training and international sport.²

As a boy, Choi’s father sent him to study calligraphy and Chinese classics in hopes that his son might earn a living carving tombstones. From his calligraphy teacher, he secretly learned tae kyun, Korea’s indigenous martial art that emphasizes fighting with one’s feet. At age 21, Choi moved to Japan to further his education and studied karate, earning a second- degree black belt. Conscripted into the Japanese Army, he was sent to Korea for duty, where he and other Korean soldiers planned to desert the Imperial Army and join the Korean Restoration Army in order to fight the Japanese. When Choi’s plans were discovered, he was sent to prison and was within days of being executed when the Japanese surrendered and Korea was liberated.

Following his release from prison, Choi journeyed to Seoul and was among the first group of officers to join the newly established ROK Army. He rose through the ranks quickly and was given several commands. At each level of command, Choi instructed his soldiers in the techniques of unarmed combat, proving that martial arts could be taught on a large scale. By the end of the Korean War, Choi had become a general officer and was tasked with forming the final division that would be created during the conflict. The 29th Division, also known as the “Fist Division,” was unique in that all soldiers had been trained in martial arts and were “ready to fight with or without weapons.”³

While commanding the Fist Division, Choi advocated martial arts training for all servicemen. GEN Choi arranged for a demonstration for Korean President Syngman Rhee in order to secure backing for his initiative. The President was impressed—particularly after witnessing a master break 13 roofing tiles with a single strike—and directed that all soldiers receive martial arts training.⁴

Despite President Rhee’s endorsement, MG Choi faced many obstacles in implementing his plans. The new program had to compete with traditional combat skills training—marksmanship and physical fitness training—as well as established fighting programs. The Service academies, modeled on their American counterparts, were teaching boxing.⁵ Because the 29th Division was stationed on Cheju Island, far from the frontlines, MG Choi was never able to show the benefits of martial arts training in combat. Consequently, many general officers were skeptical of the alleged benefits and critical of his activities.⁶

Even among advocates of martial arts training, there was no consensus that the style advocated by GEN Choi was the best. Following liberation from Japan, there had been a resurgence in the teaching and practice of martial arts, and no less than 17 forms existed at the time of the Korean War.⁷ The issue of standardizing the forms was resolved at a meeting in April 1955 between now-MG Choi and the leaders of each of the major styles of martial arts. During this meeting MG Choi persuaded the other masters to adopt his style and the Korean Tae Kwon Do Association was formed.

MG Choi continued to advocate martial arts training for all servicemen. Assigned to the Army Staff in 1959, he created the Division of Martial Arts Training and was appointed its first director.⁸ In this capacity, MG Choi led demonstration teams on visits to Taiwan and the Republic of Vietnam in 1959. South Vietnamese military officials were so impressed with the demonstration that they requested the Korean Government send tae kwon do instructors to Vietnam to institute a similar program there. Four Korean instructors taught 50 Vietnamese servicemen during 1962–63.⁹

Political and personal rivalries threatened MG Choi’s initiatives when Army MG Park Chung Hee seized power in a coup on 16 May 1961. Park ordered the popular general into retirement and sent him abroad as the Korean Ambassador to Malaysia in 1962. MG Choi remained a tireless advocate of tae kwon do, sponsoring and leading exhibitions in Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries. He revised the forms for tae kwon do and began writing an English language textbook. While serving in Malaysia, Choi traveled to Vietnam and, on the roof of his hotel, met with the Korean instructors and taught them the new forms. He directed that his changes be taught to soldiers in both Korea and Vietnam.

LtGen Louis W. Walt, Commanding General (CG), III MAF, speaks with Capt Jung, Commanding Officer, 11th Company, the morning following the battle, surrounded by BGen Kim Young Sang, CG, 2d ROK Marine Brigade, and other senior Marines. Photo courtesy of the Vietnam Veterans of Korea.

Tae Kwon Do in the Vietnam War
In response to appeals for international support, the Korean Government dispatched 10 tae kwon do instructors and a mobile Army surgical hospital to South Vietnam on 13 September 1964, the first increments of Seoul’s lengthy and significant commitment to the Republic of Vietnam.¹⁰ The instructors taught South Vietnamese servicemen from all military Services. The tae kwon do detachment would be the longest serving unit in Vietnam—by 1973, 647 tae kwon do instructors had served in Vietnam.¹¹ The arrival of combat forces in 1965 would further demonstrate the value of martial arts training by friend and foe alike.

The first commander of ROK Forces Vietnam, Army LTG Jae Myung Shin, was an early pupil of MG Choi, earning a fifth-degree black belt.¹² A devoted practitioner of tae kwon do, he practiced 30 minutes daily, and visitors were apt to find the general leading his entire staff in martial arts training in front of his headquarters.¹³ Similar activities occurred at the headquarters of the Capital and White Horse Divisions and the Blue Dragon Brigade.

The knowledge of the Korean’s martial arts prowess, fueled by frequent unit-wide demonstrations, quickly spread to allies and adversaries. Allied servicemen envied this skill, believing that the Koreans were the most feared opponent on the battlefield. Captured enemy documents confirmed this suspicion. Viet Cong commanders ordered their troops to avoid contact with the Koreans “at all costs, unless a Viet Cong victory is 100% certain.”¹⁴ Should they come into contact, the Viet Cong were advised to retreat rather than fight.¹⁵

Because the Viet Cong were hesitant to engage them, the Korean units were able to restore stability within their assigned areas of responsibility. By 1966, 8 months after the Capital Division arrived, the Tigers had secured the port of Qui Nhon and Highways 1 and 19 in Binh Dinh Province, a feat that neither the South Vietnamese nor the French had been able to accomplish in over 20 years.¹⁶ And the actions of a single company of Marines from the Blue Dragon Brigade would make a small hamlet at Tra Binh Dong a place that would become synonymous with Korean military and martial arts prowess.

The Battle of Tra Binh Dong¹⁷
In early February 1967, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) commanders took advantage of the truce following the Tet holiday to begin preparations for a major attack. The 2d NVA Division infiltrated into the coastal lowlands of the Quang Ngai Province. Using elephants to transport 120mm mortars, the division assembled a regimental-sized force composed of two battalions from the 1st and 21st Regiments and a battalion of Viet Cong guerrillas in order to attack the city of Quang Ngai and the U.S. Marine base at Chu Lai. Built at the direction of LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, the base was a critical aviation and logistics center that supported operations across the I Corps tactical zone.¹⁸ The airbase was home to nine fixed-wing squadrons assigned to Marine Aviation Group 12 (MAG–12) and MAG–13, the 1st Service and 9th Engineer Support Battalions, and the 1st Hospital Company.¹⁹

The 2d ROK Marine Brigade had been assigned a tactical area of operations within the Chu Lai region since August 1966. Although the Blue Dragons were not under the command of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), Korean and American Marines coordinated their actions in defense of the base. The Blue Dragon Brigade was organized around three infantry battalions supported by a composite (105mm and 155mm) artillery battalion, heavy mortar company, an aviation detachment, and headquarters, service, medical, and security companies.

The 3d Battalion’s 11th Company was assigned near the village of Tra Binh Dong. Capt Jung Kyung Jin, a graduate of the Korean Naval Academy’s 15th Class (1961), commanded 294 Marines positioned in a clearing atop a small hill on the outskirts of the village. Within the 300- by 200-meter heart-shaped perimeter, the Marines built trenches connecting their fighting positions, mortar pits, and command posts. Barbed wire and claymore mines surrounded the trenches, and heavy and light machineguns were interspersed throughout the perimeter. Capt Jung’s company was reinforced with a section of 4.2-inch mortars, a communications detachment, and supported by the brigade’s 105mm and 155mm artillery batteries.

On 14 February 1967, at approximately 2320, an enemy force approached the company’s perimeter from the west. A Marine in the observation post detected the movement and reported back to the 3d Platoon. Capt Jung quickly placed the company on alert. He waited until the platoon-sized unit closed to within 5 meters of the company’s perimeter before ordering his Marines to fire. Flares lit up the sky, revealing one corpse tangled in the wire and the remaining Vietnamese withdrawing to the tree line. Believing that the objective of this attack was to test the Marines’ defense, Capt Jung immediately prepared his company for the larger attack that would surely follow, assigning additional Marines to the listening posts, reapportioning ammunition, checking crew-served weapons, and reviewing fire support plans. Using the call sign “Seoul,” Capt Jung ordered his platoon commanders to remain vigilant throughout the night.

At 0410, approximately 2,400 North Vietnamese soldiers began their attack on the 11th Company with an intense barrage of mortar and recoilless rifle fire. One battalion advanced from the southeast, blowing whistles, beating drums, and screaming “Tai Han ra di, ra di” (come out Koreans) as they advanced on the 1st Platoon’s position. Two minutes later, two more battalions attacked from the north to the 3d Platoon’s sector. The Marines immediately responded with rifle and machinegun fire. Under attack from two directions, Capt Jung ordered the weapons platoon commander to direct fires from the company’s mortars and provide a situation report to the battalion commander, while telling the forward observer to begin coordinating artillery support from the brigade’s 105mm and 155mm batteries. Clad in a running shirt under his flak jacket, Capt Jung moved about the company’s perimeter, assessing the situation and encouraging his Marines. Despite the intensity of direct and indirect fire weapons and claymore mines, the North Vietnamese continued to advance upon the company’s position, attacking in human waves.

Newspaper headlines about the battle. All major Korean and English language papers, including the Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun, Korea Herald, and Pacific Stars and Stripes, gave front page cover to accounts of the battle. Photo courtesy of ROKMC Headquarters.

Rearmed and reequipped, the third wave of the assault attacked the 3d Platoon’s position and destroyed the protective wire with Bangalore torpedoes. Led by soldiers armed with rocket propelled grenades and flamethrowers, the North Vietnamese attempted to infiltrate a platoon into the breach at approximately 0422. SSgt Bae Jang Choon’s 1st Squad bore the brunt of the assault. Despite a serious wound to his right shoulder, SSgt Bae refused to abandon his position, ordering his Marines to stand their ground and prepare for hand-to-hand combat. The fighting shifted from rifles to grenades as North Vietnamese commanders continued to push soldiers into the breach. Entrenching tools, pix axes, and fists became the Marines’ weapons when the North Vietnamese entered the trenches.

In the face of an overwhelming and relentless enemy, the actions of the squad were characterized by tenacity and selflessness. PFC Kim Myoug Deok killed 10 enemy soldiers with his automatic rifle as they crawled toward his position. Despite serious injuries received from hand-to-hand combat, Sgt Lee Hak Won took handgrenades in both hands, waited for the enemy to draw near, and detonated the grenades in a suicide attack that killed himself and four Vietnamese soldiers. PFC Lee Young Bok, who was the only member of the squad not to have been killed or injured at this point, lured the enemy toward his position, disappeared into a spider hole, then released several grenades as the soldiers entered the trench, temporarily obstructing the attack.

In the 1st Platoon sector, the North Vietnamese set up a mortar firing point that was now firing upon the company command post. 2dLt Shin Won Bae, 1st Platoon commander, immediately assembled an assault force to destroy the mortar position, located behind a group of rocks approximately 100 meters in front of his platoon’s position. Ordering his squad leaders to provide covering fire, 2dLt Shin and his platoon sergeant, GySgt Kim Yong Kil, led a fire team toward the rocks amidst constant enemy fire. When they closed to within 20 meters of the objective, GySgt Kim threw two handgrenades toward the hidden enemy. At the instant the grenades exploded, the Marines moved forward, repeating this tactic until they reached the rocks. Twenty dead soldiers surrounded the three menacing tubes, which the Marines quickly seized and withdrew to the platoon’s position.

On the other side of the perimeter, the entire 3d Platoon was engaged in hand-to-hand combat as they fought to hold their position against the Vietnamese attack. Discovering two soldiers attempting to take the Marines’ 60mm mortars from the mortar pit, PFC Lee Ki On struck both in the face with the butt of his pistol, recovered the mortars, then killed the pair with a handgrenade. As two Marines fought enemy soldiers within the confines of the 4.2-inch mortar pit, a North Vietnamese armed with a flamethrower advanced on the pit, spewing flames. PFCs Kim Bo Hyun and Yung Sang Yul dashed toward the enemy under cover of friendly fire, attacked the flamethrower with grenades in a spectacular explosion, and seized one light machinegun.

The North Vietnamese attempted the same tactic against the 1st Platoon, sending soldiers armed with two flamethrowers into the breach in the platoon’s lines. 2dLt Shin and SSgt Oh Sung Hwan dashed toward the flames. Firing machineguns and throwing handgrenades, the two Marines killed the soldiers, seized the Soviet-made flamethrowers, and rallied the platoon to restore the perimeter.

Two hours into the attack, the Marines faced a grave situation. The North Vietnamese continued to attack from two directions, had breached the perimeter at both points of attack, and now held approximately one-third of the company’s position. Believing that his position might be overrun, Capt Jung considered calling for a napalm strike on his own position from U.S. Marine Corps aircraft on station.²⁰ However, the thick fog and rain made visibility so poor that even this desperate measure was not an option. More significantly, the ferocity of the enemy attack began to falter in the face of the desperate resistance by the 3d Platoon Marines. Capt Jung ordered the 2d Platoon commander to provide one squad to 3d Platoon to assist them in their fight.

At 0630 1stLt Kim Se Chang, the forward observer attached to the company, determined the likely location of the regimental command post and began directing fires from the brigade’s 105mm howitzers against it. The Blue Dragon artillerymen responded with devastating fires that soon crippled the enemy’s ability to direct the attack. His assistant, SSgt Kim Hyun Chul, refused to take the binoculars from his eyes despite intense small arms fire as he scanned the trees in search of the enemy’s mortars. Locating the enemy 61mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars, he reported their locations to his lieutenant who quickly passed them along to the fire direction center. The Marine artillery quickly overwhelmed the enemy mortars.

Isolated from their commander and lacking fire support, the North Vietnamese attack began to falter as casualties rapidly mounted. Capt Jung then made what would be the critical decision of the battle—assembling a squad-sized counterattack force from the 1st and 2d Platoons and ordering it into the breach to isolate the North Vietnamese soldiers within the perimeter. 1stLt Kim Ki Hong, the weapons platoon commander, volunteered to lead the Marines in a daring and courageous counterattack. As the 3d Platoon Marines and North Vietnamese soldiers engaged in hand-to-hand combat in the trenches immediately below the company’s observation post, 1stLt Kim led his squad in a double envelopment of the North Vietnamese within the perimeter beginning at 0652. The lieutenant quickly killed five enemy soldiers with his pistol and began pushing the enemy back into the breach. Encouraged and emboldened by the attack, SSgt Kim Son Kwan, the 3d Platoon platoon sergeant, led his Marines in joining the assault, shouting and using whatever weapon was available to strike the enemy. With the North Vietnamese surrounded by the assault force, it was the Koreans turn to shout “ra di, ra di.” The North Vietnamese refused calls to surrender and continued a desperate resistance, only to be shot to death by the Marines.

The soldiers who managed to escape the Marines linked up with North Vietnamese support units. In order to lure the company-sized force toward the Marine position, at 0724 Capt Jung ordered the 3d Platoon to destroy its bunkers and withdraw to the company observation post. 1st and 2d Platoons were directed to envelop the attackers on order. Sensing victory, the North Vietnamese again began to beat gongs as they advanced upon the company for a final time. When they closed to within 80 meters, Capt Jung ordered his Marines to fire and began coordinating fires from the brigade’s heavy mortar company. Shortly thereafter, the skies cleared and four U.S. Marine Corps A–4 Skyhawks repeatedly attacked the remaining Vietnamese force. Helicopters followed the attack aircraft and cut their path of retreat.

At 0800, 16 helicopters carrying the 6th Company, 2d Battalion arrived from the Blue Dragon Brigade headquarters. Advancing outward from the protective wire, the Marine reinforcements began clearing operations. The fleeing North Vietnamese left the bodies of 243 soldiers behind. An additional 60 soldiers were presumed to have been killed. As a testament to the ferocity of the battle, over 100 North Vietnamese corpses lay within the company’s perimeter, and 140 bodies lay next to the protective wire. One of the two prisoners captured during the fighting was a North Vietnamese battalion commander. The company also captured 3 flamethrowers, 5 antitank rocket launchers, 2 machineguns, 28 rifles, 100 pieces of dynamite, and over 6,000 rounds of ammunition. The 11th Company lost 15 Marines during the fighting, and 33 were injured. Following the defeat, the North Vietnamese abandoned plans for subsequent attacks against the Chu Lai airbase and the city of Quang Ngai.

News of the battle traveled throughout the country and world. The commanding generals of III MAF and 2d ROK Marine Brigade went to Tra Binh Dong and met with the 11th Company Marines the morning of the battle. They were quickly followed by the commanders of I Corps, ROK Forces Vietnam, and the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam. After being briefed on the battle, President Park Chung Hee directed that all enlisted Marines in the 11th Company be promoted one rank, the first unit-wide promotion since the Korean War. He also dispatched the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and Marine Commandant to Vietnam. Defense Minister Kim Sung Eun—the most storied Marine commander of the Korean War, commander of the only other unit to be promoted en masse, and former Commandant—promoted the Marines on behalf of the President.

The Korean Government awarded more decorations for the battle of Tra Binh Dong than any other action of the Vietnam War. Capt Jung and 2dLt Shin received the Taeguk Medal, Korea’s equivalent of the Medal of Honor; the Korean Government awarded the medal only 11 times during the war, and Tra Binh Dong was the only battle for which the medal was awarded to two individuals. GySgt Kim and SSgt Bae received the Ulchi Medal, Korea’s second highest award for valor; the Chung Mu Medal, the third highest military decoration, was awarded to 11 Marines. The 11th Company received the U.S. and ROK Presidential Unit Citations in recognition of their “effective teamwork, aggressive fighting spirit and many individual acts of heroism.”²¹

Accounts of the battle were carried in media throughout the world. The New York Times reported the battle as the “South Korean’s greatest victory in their 15 months in South Vietnam.”²² Following a briefing to foreign journalists, the phrase “Myth-Making Marines” began to appear in the press, continuing the legacy of the “Ghost-Catching Marines” and “Invincible Marines” of the Korean War.

Surveying the aftermath of the battle. LtGen Walt and Capt Jung view the bodies of Viet Cong and NVA soldiers killed during the Battle of Tra Binh Dong. Photo courtesy of ROKMC Headquarters.

Lessons Learned and Epilogue
The battle of Tra Binh Dong is studied by military professionals throughout Korea, and its lessons are taught to all Marines. The ROK Marine Corps (ROKMC) cites four factors as critical to the 11th Company’s victory: the distinguished combat leadership of the company and platoon commanders, the hard fighting by all Marines in the unit, the effective use of fire support, and the boldness of the counterattack.²³

The role of martial arts training in the battle has been a topic of discussion for nearly four decades. At the press conference following the battle, Capt Jung was adamant in his opinion that tae kwon do contributed greatly to the combat abilities and fighting spirit of the Korean Marines, both enlisted and officers.²⁴ In a graphic description, Time noted that martial arts training was critical to the victory:

It was knife to knife and hand-to-hand—and in that sort of fighting the Koreans, with their deadly tae kwon do (a form of karate), are unbeatable. When the action stopped shortly after dawn, 104 enemy bodies lay within the wire, many of them eviscerated or brained.²⁵

Asked to provide their opinions for this article, both Taeguk Medal recipients stated that martial arts training significantly contributed to the Marines’ victory. LtCol Jung, now retired and living in Seoul, emphasized two areas in which tae kwon do influenced his Marines:

First, the enemy suddenly overwhelmed our trenches and continuously piled up to the degree that we were unable to use rifles and bayonets as weapons. There were many instances in which we were pushing and pulling each other inside the trenches. At that time, Tae Kwon Do became the Korean Marines’ weapon and by hitting the enemy in his vital parts, we brought him under our control.

Second, it can be seen that the courage to be unafraid when facing your enemy was trained through Tae Kwon Do. Although we didn’t have a path of retreat and had to stay in our position, the fortitude to fight bravely while exposed to the enemy led to victory at the Battle of Tra Binh Dong.²⁶

Retired MajGen Shin Won Bae, who later commanded the Blue Dragon unit (now the 2d ROK Marine Division) provided similar insights, noting:

Even though tactics call for fixing bayonets to rifles during close quarters to neutralize the enemy, our weapon at the time, the M–1 rifle, was not a weapon that could be wielded quickly. In urgent situations, the Marine in the front would fiercely strike the enemy’s face and vital parts using Tae Kwon Do, causing him to momentarily lose his will to fight. Then a second Marine would finish off the enemy with the rifle. Additionally, striking the enemy with an entrenching tool was highly effective in destroying the will to fight among the enemy’s lead elements. While Tae Kwon Do demonstrated its practical effectiveness on the battlefield, more importantly, martial arts training instilled the confidence to defeat the enemy in each Marine. I think this is the greater significance of Tae Kwon Do training.²⁷

Yet LtCol Jung is careful to emphasize the importance of fire support in the battle, noting that the artillery and mortar fires prevented the North Vietnamese from sending reinforcements to the troops engaged with the Korean Marines.²⁸

As if to underscore the strength of the ROKMC Martial Arts Program, the Korean Marine team won the National Tae Kwon Do Championship in November 1967, the same year as the battle of Tra Binh Dong.²⁹ The following year ROKMC headquarters began to include tae kwon do with marksmanship qualification and physical fitness testing as measures of combat readiness. (Tae kwon do is now part of the ROKMC physical fitness test.)³⁰ Despite the demonstrated success of the martial arts program, both the Marine Corps and Army continued to experiment with new styles and techniques. The Marines developed mu chuk do, a more lethal form of tae kwon do. However, after teaching this form throughout the Corps for several years, the Marines reverted to tae kwon do as the standard, reserving mu chuk do for Marines assigned to reconnaissance units.³¹ Similarly, Special forces units practice tu kong moo sul, while tae kwon do remains the standard for the ROK Army.³²

For American Marines, the early history of the Korean martial arts program and the battle of Tra Binh Dong provide four important lessons. First, developing and instituting the program took time and required the dedicated efforts of senior leaders and commanders. It took over a decade from the first demonstrations to the adoption of training objectives and standards. Second, because many of the program’s initial benefits were psychological, they were difficult to measure. Indeed, it is impossible to quantify how the confidence and fighting ability of soldiers and Marines were improved through tae kwon do or the number of times North Vietnamese or Viet Cong units bypassed Korean units. Third, martial arts training proved critical in close combat. The ability of the Korean Marines to prevail against overwhelming odds in hand-to-hand fighting in the battle of Tra Binh Dong is a testament to the benefits of tae kwon do training. Lastly, martial arts training is one of many necessary combat skills. Timely and accurate fire support, exceptional combat leadership, and countless individual acts of courage all contributed to the 11th Company’s victory.

Fifty years after MG Choi began to advocate martial arts training for Korean soldiers, tae kwon do has grown far beyond its military roots. It is the national martial art of Korea, practiced by millions throughout the world, and has been an Olympic medal sport since 2000. In turn, the growth of tae kwon do as a sport has further strengthened the Korean military’s martial arts program. Most men entering the military have already received significant training in some form of martial arts. Because of its focus on developing the physical skills, combative fitness, and mental discipline for combat, it is unlikely that the MCMAP will spur a similar revolution in sport. However, the MCMAP has been an unqualified success in improving the fighting abilities and warrior ethos of all Marines. Commenting on its applicability to today’s conflicts, GEN Shin notes, “For the U.S. Marine Corps, which will encounter battlefields in various countries in the war against terrorism, Tae Kwon Do training on a regular basis is advisable.”³³ Whether at bases in their home countries or deployed overseas, American and Korean Marines continue to train in martial arts, working to uphold the ideal that Marines are the most respected and feared adversary on the battlefield.

Notes

1. In order to meet military training requirements, the Japanese Government lifted the ban on martial arts training, teaching Koreans judo and juken-jutsu (bayonet art) in 1941 and karate and kung fu in 1943. Dakin Burdick, “People and Events of T’aekwondo’s Formative Years,” Journal of Asian Martial Arts, Volume 6, Issue 1, 1997, pp. 30–49, updated and available online in two parts at http://www.indiana.edu/~iutkd/history/tkdhist.html and “A History of Taekwondo,” copyright 1990, available online at http://www.indiana.edu/~iutkd/history/dbhistor.html.

2. All names follow the convention of listing the surname first with the exception of President Syngman Rhee, whose popular usage dictates otherwise.

3. He Young Kimm, “General Choi Hong Hi: A Tae Kwon Do History Lesson,” Tae Kwon Do Times, January 2000,
p. 48.

4. Burdick, “People and Events of T’aekwondo’s Formative Years,” Part 1, p. 7.

5. Hae Gun Sa Gwan Hak Kyo (Republic of Korea Naval Academy), Dae Han Min Gook Hae Gun Sa Gwan Hak Kyo 50 Nyun Sa (1946–1996) (The Fifty Year History of the Republic of Korea Naval Academy (1946-1996)). Chinhae: ROK Naval Academy, 1996, p. 21. Translations of this and subsequent Korean sources are by the author.

6. Kimm, p. 49.

7. Dohrenwend, R.E., “Informal History of Chung Do Kwan Tae Kwon Do,” available online at https://www.sos.mtu.edu/husky/tkdhist.htm.

8. Burdick, “A History of Taekwondo,” p. 2.

9. Kimm, p. 53.

10. LTG Larsen, Stanley R. and BG James. L Collins, Jr., USA, Allied Participation in Vietnam, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 121–2.

11. Kimm, p. 53.

12. Kimm, p. 51.

13. “South Viet Nam: Other Guns,” Time, 22 July 1966, p. 26.

14. Ibid.

15. Kimm, p. 53.

16. Time, July 22, 1966, p. 26.

17. Unless otherwise noted, accounts of the battle are taken from Tra Binh Dong Chon Tu (ROKMC Won (sic) Great Triumph at Tra Binh Dong), http://www.vietvet.co.kr. This is the most readable account of the battle and accurately reflects the events of the battle contained in the official ROKMC historical accounts.

18. Summers, Jr., COL Harry G., Vietnam War Almanac, Facts on File Publications, New York, 1985, p. 119.

19. Tefler, Maj Gary L., LtCol Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1984, p. 6.

20. Personal letter from LtCol Jung Kyung Jin, ROKMC(Ret) to the author, dated 29 April 2004.

21. United States Presidential Unit Citation presented to the 11th Company (Reinforced), 3d Battalion, 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade, 28 May 1968.

22. “Koreans Kill 242 in Vietnam Clash,” The New York Times, 16 February 1967, p. 3.

23. Hae Byung Dae Sa Ryoung Bu (ROKMC Headquarters). Hae Byung Dae Won Haeng Dong Chi Chim Seo (Guidebook for Marines), ROKMC Headquarters, Seoul, Korea, 1996, p. 29.

24. LtCol Jung letter.

25. “A Savage Week,” Time, 24 February 1967, p. 25.

26. LtCol Jung letter.

27. Undated personal letter from MajGen Shin Won Bae, ROKMC(Ret), received May 2004.

28. LtCol Jung letter.

29. Don Su Choi, Hae Byung Sa (Marine Corps History), Do Seo Publishing, Seoul, Korea, 1994, p. 64.

30. The Marine Education Base, which oversaw initial training for officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and enlisted Marines, initially established an objective of 85 percent of Marines earning the highest tae kwon do certification. Hae Byung Dae Sa Ryoung Bu (ROKMC Headquarters), Hae Byung Sa Jae 6 Jip (Marine Corps History, Volume 6. 1 January 1968 to 31 December 1969), ROKMC Headquarters, Seoul, Korea, 1971, p. 461.

31. Mu chuk do, the invincible way, takes its name from the phrase mu chuk hae byung, given to the Marines by President Syngman Rhee in recognition of their actions at the battle of Mount Do Sol during the Korean War.

32. Johty, Ben, “The Best of the Best: Korean MacGyvers,” The Korea Herald, 7 July 2001, pp. 6–7.

33. MG Shin letter.

>LtCol Durand is an intelligence officer and East Asia foreign area officer. He served 5 years in Korea, including assignments with the Special U.S. Liaison Advisor, Korea; Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Korea; and the ROK Naval War College. He is currently a student at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies.