Let me preface any of my comments on this subject by divulging that I
am one of the few Nets fans on this planet.  Initially, I did not
like the Kidd trade because watching him and seeing his statistics
underwhelmed me.  Having watched him more closely this year I can say
that I may have been a bit harsh on him for being a poor shooter (the
stats don't lie, his shooting is ugly).  Without tracking it
statistically, it does seem that Kidd is a better defender than
Marbury was.  (I still feel that Marbury will be clearly a better
player Kidd in a matter of a year or two).  The only other special
thing I notice about Kidd (that I had not seen before) is his ability
to push the ball effectively once his team gains possession of the
ball.  (This value may be in some way tied to his defensive
ability).  It seems like he finds guys on fast breaks much better
than marbury did.  THat being said, the primary reason the nets have
improved is that kittles has replaced lucious harris and macullouch
has replace mcilvaine (and the other crap they played their).
Kittles and Jefferson help immesurably in terms of creating offense
and actually playing defense and Macullouch can actually block a shot
and make a lay up.  I would venture to say that Kidd for marbury is
probably equal in terms of value right now.


--- In APBR_analysis@y..., bchaikin@a... wrote:
>
> i agree that kidd "...ain't so efficient...", at least not as much
as he
> could be (he is still very good), but i believe primarily because
he can't
> shoot. his career effective FG% is less than 45% (pretty bad),
especially for
> someone taking 13 shots/game. his career 43% on 2s and 32% on 3s is
just
> plain awful for a 38-40 min/g player.....
>
> however his turnovers are not high, on the contrary his ratio of
turnovers
> per possession is 5% (1 turnover per 20 ball possessions), ever so
slightly
> higher than average but in line with most point guards (for
comparison isiah
> thomas' career mark is 6%, one of the worst for a name point guard,
> stockton's is 4%, robert pack was close to but not quite at 7%,
muggsy bogues
> was between 3%-4%). ...
>
> his career TO/MIN is .089, in line with stockton (.090), marbury
(.086), rod
> strickland (.087), and sam cassell (.092). for comparison mark
jackson's
> career TO/MIN is .081, and other players for comparison are gary
payton
> (.069) and van exel (.065)....
>
> while his career eff FG% is < 45%, stockton's is 55% and marbury,
strickland,
> and cassell's are all at 46%-47%. i also agree that his defense
speaks for
> itself, as his 1st team nominations attest to, and that is key as
it is
> superior to most if not all point guards, with payton in his prime
being a
> good comparison. but his abysmal shooting, not his turnovers, is
the key
> reason for his overall effectiveness not being as good as say
someone like
> stockton in his prime.....
>
> bob chaikin
> bchaikin@b...

I've been meaning to look at this for a while, but I'm only a couple
days away from being free of my massive workload.  So here is my
question:  Why has Philly done so much better since Iverson came
back?  Offensive or defensive improvement?  If it's D, then what's he
doing?  We know he's good for steals and basic off-the-ball D.  Is
that it?  Have steals or forced TO's gone up?  If it's O, then how?
The guy isn't shooting well.  Has he really "made his teammates
better"?  Has he improved the team's ability to get OR's?

Easy questions, but I won't have time to look at them for a couple
more days.  Anyone else want to take a stab?

The other thing that I did get a chance to look at is the preliminary
effects of the zone.  The big thing I thought I noticed and then did
a quick study on was that the best offensive teams of last seem to be
doing a lot better this year than the best defensive teams of last
year.  Basically, I did a statistical correlation between last year's
offensive ratings and this year's win% and found a very good
correlation.  No correlation existed between last year's DRtgs and
this year's win%.  This implies that last year's best offensive teams
tend to be good this year.  What I then did was look at the
correlation between last year's O and D rtgs and the improvement in
record from last year.  What I saw was that poor defensive teams last
year are more likely to be improved (and good defensive teams are
more likely to be worse).  No real effect with offense.

What this implies to me is that last year's good offensive teams were
good and continue to be good (Lakers, Bucks, Mavs are the examples in
my head).  It also echoes the fact that the Knicks and Heat and
Hornets, who were good D teams last year, are struggling this year.
The Wolves and Nets, who weren't particularly good defensively last
year, are improved.  I need to complete the stats and can then send
them on.

What does this mean in terms of the zone?  It implies that it is
serving to equalize defenses, which makes sense.  By giving teams
another option defensively, it should narrow the gap a bit between
the best and worst D teams.  That seems to be happening.

Dean Oliver
Journal of Basketball Studies

I was just watching a replay of some Sixers/Pacers from last season.
When Iverson is in the game, nothing happens without his influence.
On D: if he isn't stealing the ball, he's missing a steal; this
prompts the opposition to hurry to take advantage.  Teams often react
badly to any disruption in their offensive rhythm.

On O: when Iverson beats his man, the defense is broke.  Even if he
misses his shot, the opposition seems to be constantly scrambling,
increasing the chaos that favors the offensive team; i.e. offensive
boards, missed assignments.

Not all missed shots are equal (harking back to earlier Tendex
discussion).  On a team without a steady supply of scorers off the
bench (an understatement, in Philly's case), points however-gotten
are welcome.

--- In APBR_analysis@y..., "Dean Oliver" <deano@r...> wrote:
>
> I've been meaning to look at this for a while, but I'm only a
couple
> days away from being free of my massive workload.  So here is my
> question:  Why has Philly done so much better since Iverson came
> back?  Offensive or defensive improvement?  If it's D, then what's
he
> doing?  We know he's good for steals and basic off-the-ball D.  Is
> that it?  Have steals or forced TO's gone up?  If it's O, then
how?
> The guy isn't shooting well.  Has he really "made his teammates
> better"?  Has he improved the team's ability to get OR's?
>
> Easy questions, but I won't have time to look at them for a couple
> more days.  Anyone else want to take a stab?

This is a good analysis (preliminary) and sounds about right, both
from what the numbers have shown, and what one might expect.
It looked to me as though there were a lot of really high shooting
pct around the league, but in total, the league-wide scoring
efficiency is .509 (.510 last season).

> The other thing that I did get a chance to look at is the
preliminary
> effects of the zone.  The big thing I thought I noticed and then
did
> a quick study on was that the best offensive teams of last seem to
be
> doing a lot better this year than the best defensive teams of last
> year.  Basically, I did a statistical correlation between last
year's
> offensive ratings and this year's win% and found a very good
> correlation.  No correlation existed between last year's DRtgs and
> this year's win%.  This implies that last year's best offensive
teams
> tend to be good this year.  What I then did was look at the
> correlation between last year's O and D rtgs and the improvement in
> record from last year.  What I saw was that poor defensive teams
last
> year are more likely to be improved (and good defensive teams are
> more likely to be worse).  No real effect with offense.
>
> What this implies to me is that last year's good offensive teams
were
> good and continue to be good (Lakers, Bucks, Mavs are the examples
in
> my head).  It also echoes the fact that the Knicks and Heat and
> Hornets, who were good D teams last year, are struggling this
year.
> The Wolves and Nets, who weren't particularly good defensively last
> year, are improved.  I need to complete the stats and can then send
> them on.
>
> What does this mean in terms of the zone?  It implies that it is
> serving to equalize defenses, which makes sense.  By giving teams
> another option defensively, it should narrow the gap a bit between
> the best and worst D teams.  That seems to be happening.
>
> Dean Oliver
> Journal of Basketball Studies

Random quick notes

It's really the Iverson/McKie effect. The media seem to have forgotten that
McKie missed the team's first 4 games.

Current record of opponents in first 5 games (not including games vs.
Philly)
Minnesota: 7-1
Dallas: 5-3
Washington: 1-7
Indiana: 5-6
Houston: 5-4
Overall: 23-21

Current record of opponents in past 5 games (not including games vs. Philly)
Dallas: 5-3
Miami: 2-6
Charlotte: 4-4
Atlanta: 3-6
New Jersey: 7-1
Overall: 21-20

No real difference. Only other thoughts on the strength of schedule would be
that three of the first five oppoenents were Western Conference opponenets
while only one in the next five was.

Over the last 5 games as a team . . .
taking 10 more shots, one less three-pointer
Taking just over 6 more free throws per game
Averaging over 7 more steals per game
Averaging 16 more points per game
More than 4 fewer turnovers per game

Opposition over last 5 games . . .
Taking one less shot
Taking one less three pointer
Field goal percentage down from .427 to .396
Three point field goal percentage down from .324 to .209
Averaging nearly 3 fewer assists
Averaging nearly 5 more turnovers
Averaging nearly 2 fewer steals

Just eyeballing it, it looks like the return of McKie and Iverson has
increased the pace of the 76ers games.

First 5 games - only 1 game with Philly scoring more than 80 points
Last 5 games - all 5 games over 80 points, 4 games over 90

McKie and Iverson's vs. Bell and Claxton in their 10 starts
M and I are on the left, B and C on the right

38.0 (Pts)  22.0
.391, 71-of-182 (FGPct) .453, 48-of-106
.250, 7-of-28 (3GPct) .200, 3-of-15
.745, 41-of-55 (FTPct) .875, 21-of-24)
9.6 (Rbs) 6.3
13.0 (Ast) 8.9
5.00 (Stls) 1.83
7.2 (TO) 5.1

The increase in turnovers probably isn't a "real" increase since McKie and
Iverson are both probably effecting more possessions per game than Bell and
Claxton.

Bell's percentages are up since going back to his bench role.

I'll try and run some efficiency ratings when I get back from watching the
Carolina Panthers stink up the joint against the San Francisco 49ers.

Time for me to get back to these...

--- In APBR_analysis@y..., "Dean Oliver" <deano@t...> wrote:
>
> 1.  Does it reflect better on a player if, when he plays best, his
> team loses or if, when he plays better, his team wins?
>

No easy answer to this one.  What I have seen is that the best teams'
records do very strongly reflect their best player's percentage of
good games.  Specifically, I calculate the "winning %" of individuals
as the % of time their offensive rating is higher than their
defensive rating.  And quite consistently, a team's record reflects
the record of the player who uses the most possessions.  It varies a
little, but it seems to work.

On instinct, I say it's better if a player plays best when his teams
wins.

> 2.  What is better for a team -- a player who scores a lot of
points
> while shooting poorly (or turning the ball over a lot) or a player
> who scores few points while shooting very well?
>

As others have mentioned, context may be important here, which is an
important point.  The value of players really can't be measured with
one number.  Rodman was highly valuable to the teams that had good
scorers.  He was an extreme liability on teams that didn't have good
scorers even if he was putting up the same rebounding numbers.

> 3.  Does offense or defense "win championships"?
>

I did a study on whether it was more common for good offensive teams
to win the title or good defensive teams.  Generally, the good
offensive teams did.  The article was rather sarcastically looking at
a method I have that adjusts team offensive and defensive ratings
based on how much they "relax" -- something you can approximately
measure.  Well, if you say that teams only relax on defense, not on
offense, it says that defense wins championships a little more
frequently.  The result was half-sarcastic because of teams like last
year's Lakers.  The Lakers really turned up their defense in the
playoffs, something that started happening in the early '80's, I
beliieve.  Offense carries them, but to lock up the title, the Lakers
really needed their defense to kick in, as it did.  That may be what
the phrase meant.

> 4.  What is the ideal defender?
>

I've gotten to the point where I don't think this has an answer
either.  Big teams seem to be better defensive teams in general, but
that may be because it's the easiest physical thing to quantify.
Quickness and good hands were the hallmark of the Bulls' defensive
units.  Good hands are extremely under-rated in basketball.

> 5.  Do you want quickness or size?
>

John Wooden always said quickness.  I always felt that the Magic-led
Lakers and the Bird-led Celtics were good examples of how size wins
because they weren't that quick.  The Lakers were fast, but not
quick.  The Bulls, however, show how quickness wins.  However, they
were also quite big.  They weren't big in the middle, but they were
big at the guard position.

> 6.  Does blowing out an opponent really reflect on a team's ability?
>

The ease with which you win does matter.  But after a point, it
really doesn't matter.  I know the BCS computers account for this
now.  What I interestingly found once was that there might even be
such a thing as an "ideal score".  Winning by 30 may reflect worse on
you than winning by 25.  Weird result based upon a lot of theory.

> 7.  What is the value of having one player who can draw double
teams
> on improving the efficiency of teammates?

Hmm, I think that's what Allen Iverson's absence may help us show.
And he isn't the greatest passer.  This is one fundamental thing that
I cannot account for right now with my work.  I do try, saying that
assists are more valuable when they are to players who shoot better
(in part, presumably, because their defender had to guard the guy who
had the assist).  But it's really hard to do.  (JohnM -- this is not
in the formulas you use because it adds a lot of complexity.)

Dean Oliver
Journal of Basketball Studies

Good thing, some of us are not shy about responding to our own posts!

>--- In APBR_analysis@y..., "Dean Oliver" <deano@r...> wrote:
> Time for me to get back to these...
>
> --- In APBR_analysis@y..., "Dean Oliver" <deano@t...> wrote:
> >
> > 1.  Does it reflect better on a player if, when he plays best,
>is
> > team loses or if, when he plays better, his team wins?
>
> No easy answer to this one.  What I have seen is that the best
>teams'
> records do very strongly reflect their best player's percentage of
> good games.  Specifically, I calculate the "winning %" of
>individuals
> as the % of time their offensive rating is higher than their
> defensive rating.  And quite consistently, a team's record reflects
> the record of the player who uses the most possessions.  It varies
a
> little, but it seems to work.
>
> On instinct, I say it's better if a player plays best when his
>teams
> wins.

That surely holds true whether looking at a good team or a bad team.
In general.
What about Derrick Coleman with Charlotte?  There were some
astonishing negative correlations between his production, and his
team's success.
I think he was their most productive player in '99-00 (per-minute).

> > 2.  What is better for a team -- a player who scores a lot of
> points
> > while shooting poorly (or turning the ball over a lot) or a
player
> > who scores few points while shooting very well?
> >
>
> As others have mentioned, context may be important here, which is
an
> important point.  The value of players really can't be measured
with
> one number.  Rodman was highly valuable to the teams that had good
> scorers.  He was an extreme liability on teams that didn't have
good
> scorers even if he was putting up the same rebounding numbers.
>

Not only Iverson, but Dominique Wilkins missed more shots than he
made, yet was quite valuable in doing so.  It seemed to me, a good
many of his misses were (like Ivy's) penetration moves (usually over
rather than under), and lots of offensive rebounds ensued (Nique got
a lot of his own misses).
When was Rodman a liability, and on what teams?
I thought he became a liability (by degrees) when his scoring
evaporated, and then when his defense slipped.  And of course the
distractions necessary for his "genius" lifestyle.
Aging (and attitude) eventually made Rodman a net negative.

> > 3.  Does offense or defense "win championships"?
> >
>
> I did a study on whether it was more common for good offensive
teams
> to win the title or good defensive teams.  Generally, the good
> offensive teams did.  The article was rather sarcastically looking
at
> a method I have that adjusts team offensive and defensive ratings
> based on how much they "relax" -- something you can approximately
> measure.  Well, if you say that teams only relax on defense, not on
> offense, it says that defense wins championships a little more
> frequently.  The result was half-sarcastic because of teams like
last
> year's Lakers.  The Lakers really turned up their defense in the
> playoffs, something that started happening in the early '80's, I
> beliieve.  Offense carries them, but to lock up the title, the
Lakers
> really needed their defense to kick in, as it did.  That may be
what
> the phrase meant.
>

(I was informed, by an eyewitness, that the Lakers would be sweeping
thru last year's playoffs, because of their "swagger".  I was
skeptical.)
Championship runs require 'some' defense, but historically what ruins
most playoff runs is lack of shooting.
Shooting percents and assist rates show the most dramatic overall
dropoff in postseason play, across all players' data.  Partly this is
just increased competition, but fatigue and pressure take their toll.
Hitting the pressure shot, or even having the willingness to take the
shot, is still what defines a player, in crunch time.

> > 4.  What is the ideal defender?
> >
>
> I've gotten to the point where I don't think this has an answer
> either.  Big teams seem to be better defensive teams in general,
but
> that may be because it's the easiest physical thing to quantify.
> Quickness and good hands were the hallmark of the Bulls' defensive
> units.  Good hands are extremely under-rated in basketball.
>

Quickness vs. size is fun to watch.  Bulls were tough even with 5 mid-
sized models on the floor.  Opponents with a Muresan or a McIlvaine
just couldn't use them at all.
Good hands are IT.  A player of any size who shows up with bad hands
is pretty useless.  A few players have good hands almost every day.
I would rather come without my shot than without good hands.

> > 5.  Do you want quickness or size?
> >
>
> John Wooden always said quickness.  I always felt that the Magic-
led
> Lakers and the Bird-led Celtics were good examples of how size wins
> because they weren't that quick.  The Lakers were fast, but not
> quick.  The Bulls, however, show how quickness wins.  However, they
> were also quite big.  They weren't big in the middle, but they were
> big at the guard position.
>

Actually, the Bulls always had big bodies at their disposal -- just
not skilled, big bodies.
Sometimes quickness is not in the feet, or even in the hands, but in
anticipation.  Larry Bird was certainly not quick physically, but you
would never know that, when he was already making the move before you
could see the situation developing.

> > 6.  Does blowing out an opponent really reflect on a team's
ability?
> >
> The ease with which you win does matter.  But after a point, it
> really doesn't matter.  I know the BCS computers account for this
> now.  What I interestingly found once was that there might even be
> such a thing as an "ideal score".  Winning by 30 may reflect worse
on
> you than winning by 25.  Weird result based upon a lot of theory.
>

This always depends on coaching.  If the coach isn't blowout-minded,
it might reflect depth.  Or it might say more about your opponent.

> > 7.  What is the value of having one player who can draw double
> teams
> > on improving the efficiency of teammates?
>
> Hmm, I think that's what Allen Iverson's absence may help us show.
> And he isn't the greatest passer.  This is one fundamental thing
that
> I cannot account for right now with my work.  I do try, saying that
> assists are more valuable when they are to players who shoot better
> (in part, presumably, because their defender had to guard the guy
who
> had the assist).  But it's really hard to do.  (JohnM -- this is
not
> in the formulas you use because it adds a lot of complexity.)
>
> Dean Oliver
> Journal of Basketball Studies

I can agree that some assists are more 'impressive' than others, and
these usually do lead to a sure basket; but since the assist
doesn't "count" (literally) unless the shot is made, you get the
situation where, say, Kobe hits Shaq for the alleyoop dunk.  Good
pass, good result.  In another interval, Shaq may hit 3 outside
shooters with perfectly decent passes, and only 1 basket may result.
So why look for a way to degrade Shaq's 3 nice passes, when he is
already only getting credit for 1 measly assist?
Oftentimes, a low-pct pass leads to a high-pct shot.  And an easy
pass leads to a lower-pct shot.  Passes inside come with more
turnovers, in other words.
So, rather than over-analyze the compounding percentages, just
add 'em up.
Points is points!

Mike Goodman
cluttered desk

> > > 7.  What is the value of having one player who can draw double
> > teams
> > > on improving the efficiency of teammates?
> >
> > Hmm, I think that's what Allen Iverson's absence may help us
show.
> > And he isn't the greatest passer.  This is one fundamental thing
> that
> > I cannot account for right now with my work.  I do try, saying
that
> > assists are more valuable when they are to players who shoot
better
> > (in part, presumably, because their defender had to guard the guy
> who
> > had the assist).  But it's really hard to do.  (JohnM -- this is
> not
> > in the formulas you use because it adds a lot of complexity.)
> >
> > Dean Oliver
> > Journal of Basketball Studies
>
> I can agree that some assists are more 'impressive' than others,
and
> these usually do lead to a sure basket; but since the assist
> doesn't "count" (literally) unless the shot is made, you get the
> situation where, say, Kobe hits Shaq for the alleyoop dunk.  Good
> pass, good result.  In another interval, Shaq may hit 3 outside
> shooters with perfectly decent passes, and only 1 basket may result.
> So why look for a way to degrade Shaq's 3 nice passes, when he is
> already only getting credit for 1 measly assist?

Here is the reason:  Teams will cover that Shaq alley-oop more
tightly than the pass to the jump shooter.  It's a heck of a lot
easier to get a pass to an open jump shooter than to Shaq under the
basket.  The guy who gets it to Shaq there deserves more credit than
getting it to a random jump shooter.  My system is set up so that if
Shaq keeps passing it out to jump shooters who keep missing, it says
he is stupid in doing so because he could make his own shot at a
higher rate.

Here is the difference I calculate.  On the alley-oop to a, say, 100%
shooter, I give 50% credit to the shooter and to the assistant.  On
the random pass to the open jump shooter, who, in your example, makes
1 of 3 shots, I give 16% to the assistant, 83% to the shooter.  Most
shooting is around 50%, so the assistant gets about 25% and the
shooter gets about 75%.  Basically, if I see that a point guard goes
to a team and his teammates start shooting worse, the system accounts
for that, weakening the value of his assists.

No matter the percentage, this does avoid the double-counting that
has been raised as a problem with tendex.

> Oftentimes, a low-pct pass leads to a high-pct shot.  And an easy
> pass leads to a lower-pct shot.  Passes inside come with more
> turnovers, in other words.
> So, rather than over-analyze the compounding percentages, just
> add 'em up.
> Points is points!

The thing I wanted to recognize in accounting for assists was that
some players really should pass more, especially those that shoot
poorly.  Those that shoot poorly will be covered for their shot
less.  Hence, defenders will be covering the outlets more, making the
assists harder (Jason Kidd's low shooting percentage means he should
pass more, so this refinement helps him, for example).  It is a
refinement that makes only small differences at the NBA level (almost
never more than 5% in offensive ratings).  It makes a bigger
difference at lower levels of hoops where possessions are not roughly
equal to a point and, more importantly, where the variations in
talent on a team are much greater.

I am becoming increasingly convinced that good statistics improves
the game, while bad statistics can harm the way people play.

--- In APBR_analysis@y..., "Dean Oliver" <deano@r...> wrote:
>......It's a heck of a lot
> easier to get a pass to an open jump shooter than to Shaq under the
> basket.  The guy who gets it to Shaq there deserves more credit
>than
> getting it to a random jump shooter.

Dean, I hope you aren't advocating 'difficulty points'.
In the 1980s, the Celtics did not outjump or outrun anyone.  They won
by making good, easy passes that led to good, easy shots.  That, to
me, is good basketball.
Good, because it can be replicated by good coaching, unselfish
attitudes, and slow/white guys.

>  My system is set up so that
>if
> Shaq keeps passing it out to jump shooters who keep missing, it
>says
> he is stupid in doing so because he could make his own shot at a
> higher rate.

It is not now, nor has it ever been, dumb to pass out of the double
team.  I believe this strongly enough, that I am tempted to say it is
worth some double-counting in the assisted-basket area.
Put into practice, I claim it is more valuable in crunch time, to
have a bunch of good passers on the floor, than to have a go-to guy,
with all the eggs in one basket.

> Here is the difference I calculate.  On the alley-oop to a, say,
>100%
> shooter, I give 50% credit to the shooter and to the assistant.  On
> the random pass to the open jump shooter, who, in your example,
>makes
> 1 of 3 shots, I give 16% to the assistant, 83% to the shooter.
>Most
> shooting is around 50%, so the assistant gets about 25% and the
> shooter gets about 75%.  Basically, if I see that a point guard
>goes
> to a team and his teammates start shooting worse, the system
>accounts
> for that, weakening the value of his assists.
>
> No matter the percentage, this does avoid the double-counting that
> has been raised as a problem with tendex.
>

This graded-awarding idea makes good sense intuitively, but how can
it be applied?  How can one judge the shooting pct for an individual
shot?  In retrospect, it's either 100% or 0%.
If you watch the game, you can count 'coulda-been' assists, 'blown'
assists, or whatever.  But isn't there a need for a consistent way to
apply this, across past seasons, etc?

> The thing I wanted to recognize in accounting for assists was that
> some players really should pass more, especially those that shoot
> poorly.  Those that shoot poorly will be covered for their shot
> less.  Hence, defenders will be covering the outlets more, making
the
> assists harder (Jason Kidd's low shooting percentage means he
should
> pass more, so this refinement helps him, for example).

Some low shooting pcts are the result of unwillingness to pass, i.e.,
you can send 2-3 defenders after some guys, and they still will shoot.
Others, like Kidd, are dared to shoot; he just needs to hit the
shot.  Likely, Kidd can't pass much more than he does.

   It is a
> refinement that makes only small differences at the NBA level
(almost
> never more than 5% in offensive ratings).  It makes a bigger
> difference at lower levels of hoops where possessions are not
roughly
> equal to a point and, more importantly, where the variations in
> talent on a team are much greater.

Perhaps we can factor out assisted-points as follows:  suppose the
Utah Jazz offense consists of 50% assisted baskets, 30% unassisted
baskets, and 20% free throws (unassisted, officially).  Suppose
further that John Stockton has 50% of the assists and 10% of the
baskets; and Donyell Marshall has 20% of the hoops and 5% of the
assists.
Without doing any math, we can assume that the great majority of
Stockton's hoops are unassisted, and the majority of Marshall's are
assisted.
By factoring out each player's assists, from the team assists on his
own hoops (no one assists himself), we could achieve a fair reckoning
of each player's assisted/unassisted hoop ratio.
It may not be too effective for bench players, unless we figure an
assist-per-minute thing.

I admit to a strong prejudice for passing teams (as opposed to 1-on-1
teams).  Double-counting of assists has always haunted me, and I
always shrugged it off by believing passing gets you thru more tough
spots than the ability to go 1-on-1; so I have rewarded that
statistically.

--- In APBR_analysis@y..., "Mike Goodman" <msg_53@h...> wrote:
> Dean, I hope you aren't advocating 'difficulty points'.
> In the 1980s, the Celtics did not outjump or outrun anyone.  They
won
> by making good, easy passes that led to good, easy shots.  That, to
> me, is good basketball.

Not sure what difficulty points are, but I don't think so.  If
anything, I'm advocating "simplicity points".  Rewarding the players
who make the good passes that lead to easy shots.

>
> It is not now, nor has it ever been, dumb to pass out of the double
> team.  I believe this strongly enough, that I am tempted to say it
is
> worth some double-counting in the assisted-basket area.

That's where you are occasionally wrong.  You're right in the NBA,
probably, but the Bulls are in the NBA, so I may have to think
twice.  In HS ball, some players are good enough that they are more
likely to score out of a double-team than their teammates are wide-
open at the perimeter.  It is an extreme case and, if HS is for
learning (not winning), then passing out of a double-team is still a
good thing.

>
> This graded-awarding idea makes good sense intuitively, but how can
> it be applied?

You do a pretty good job guessing at it below.

> Perhaps we can factor out assisted-points as follows:  suppose the
> Utah Jazz offense consists of 50% assisted baskets, 30% unassisted
> baskets, and 20% free throws (unassisted, officially).  Suppose
> further that John Stockton has 50% of the assists and 10% of the
> baskets; and Donyell Marshall has 20% of the hoops and 5% of the
> assists.
> Without doing any math, we can assume that the great majority of
> Stockton's hoops are unassisted, and the majority of Marshall's are
> assisted.
> By factoring out each player's assists, from the team assists on
his
> own hoops (no one assists himself), we could achieve a fair
reckoning
> of each player's assisted/unassisted hoop ratio.
> It may not be too effective for bench players, unless we figure an
> assist-per-minute thing.

This is remarkably close to what I do, even the adjustment you have
to do for bench players.  You can estimate pretty well what
percentage of a player's shots are assisted.  It's a very complicated
formula at its most refined.  Stockton does have fewer of his made
shots assisted on.  Overall, the Jazz had 71% of their fgm's assisted
on.  My estimates of the percentages of each player's fgm's that were
assisted on:

Plyr            %asstd  asstd fgm
Malone, Karl 0.690 462
Marshall, Dony 0.793 339
Russell, Bryon 0.750 231
Stockton, John 0.479 157
Starks, John 0.735 201
Manning, Danny 0.811 200
Vaughn, Jacque 0.591 100
Polynice, Olden 0.816 168
Ostertag, Greg 0.796 111
Benoit, David 0.820 58
Lewis, Quincy 0.786 39
Stevenson, Desh 0.740 23
Crotty, John 0.616 14
Padgett, Scott 0.815 15

The sum of assisted fgm is 2118, 7 higher than the 2111 assists the
Jazz had.  So it's a little bit off, but not so much that I worry
about it.

Dean Oliver
Journal of Basketball Studies

It used to be generally true that a team rebounded 1/3 of its misses.
Lately, however, the NBA average seems to have gone down from roughly
33% to around 30%. What seems to account for this apparent trend in
recent years towards lower percentages in offensive rebounding?

While I don't have the numbers in front of me, I would venture to say that if
33% would be the "norm" that 30% would still lie within one standard
deviation, thus making it a rather small and insignificant change, especially
when a fairly small portion of the season has been completed and the
variances are greater. I could very well be wrong though.

~Ray

In a message dated 11/24/2001 11:26:16 PM Eastern Standard Time,
dlirag@... writes:

<< It used to be generally true that a team rebounded 1/3 of its misses.
  Lately, however, the NBA average seems to have gone down from roughly
  33% to around 30%. What seems to account for this apparent trend in
  recent years towards lower percentages in offensive rebounding? >>

Offensive rebounds as a percentage of total rebounds has indeed gone
down steadily over the last 12 years, at least.

Checking at 4-year intervals, we see:

year   OR%

1989  .330
1993  .320
1997  .309
2001  .282

Current 2002 level is .286.

My guess is that as defenses have improved (lower scores registered),
offensive rebounds are harder to come by, since they are often the
result of defensive breakdowns.  In other words, boxing your man off
the boards has always been part of good defensive play; and defensive
lapses are tolerated less these days, than in a previous era.

The particularly sharp decline in the OR% over the last 5 years seems
to correspond with a dropoff in league-wide scoring.



--- In APBR_analysis@y..., dlirag@h... wrote:
> It used to be generally true that a team rebounded 1/3 of its
misses.
> Lately, however, the NBA average seems to have gone down from
roughly
> 33% to around 30%. What seems to account for this apparent trend in
> recent years towards lower percentages in offensive rebounding?

Is it possible now to quantify the level of a team or player's clutch
ability with the methods available to this group?

: > Is it possible now to quantify the level of a team or player's clutch
: > ability with the methods available to this group?
:
: : First you'd have to figure out what clutch is... is clutch hitting a big
shot
: that changes momentum in the 2nd quarter? is clutch hitting a game winning
: shot, grabbing a big rebound to solidify a win? I don't really think you can
: quantify clutch, without physically watching a game 2 or 3 times.

First of all, hi group. I'm new here.

Secondly, I've been trying to come up with a definition of a "clutch shooter"
that _is_ quantifiable. Here are a few ideas:

1. a.  A clutch shooter is one who shooting % rises in the 4thQ
    b.  A clutch shooter is one who shooting % rises in the last 5 minutes.

2. A clutch shooter is one who's shooting % rises when his team is within 10
points of the other.

3. A clutch shooter is one who shooting % rises with less than 5 seconds left on
the shot clock.

I know this doesn't cover all the meanings in the word "clutch", but I think
these are still useful. Would you expect a good clutch shooter to have his
shooting % to _drop_ in the last quarter?

In any case, #1 is pretty easy to calculate using the game logs. #2 and #3 might
be impossible without actually watching the games.

"Clutch" play by a team is often reflected in the percent of close
games they win.  It might also include the quality of the opponent,
and the situation:  vying for playoff position, or actually in the
playoffs.

--- In APBR_analysis@y..., dlirag@h... wrote:
> Is it possible now to quantify the level of a team or player's
clutch
> ability with the methods available to this group?

Individual clutch play certainly makes or breaks a reputation,
particularly if one's performance leads to playoff wins and more
opportunity to prove oneself.  I have seen some very clutch
performances in losing efforts, however.

The idea of creating a momentum change in the 2nd or 3rd quarter is
curious to me.  Only in retrospect can a momentum-change be seen.
The guy who heaves up a 30-foot shot to the dismay of his coach, may
later be called Mr. Clutch because the shot went in, and the game
shifted at that point.

My gut feeling is that pro players in big games do not just stampede
to defeat because of a short run of points by the other team; and if
this does happen, it isn't really to the credit of someone making a
few consecutive shots.

I rather like the simple idea that all contributions are equal:  a
backup forward who gets 5 good minutes in the 2nd quarter, by
outplaying his counterpart, may not get a chance in the 4th quarter.
Nevertheless, if he recognizes and performs his job, he was clutch.

When someone says "yo, Reggie choked", and I say "He made 10 of 15
shots", I might then hear "yes, but he missed when it counted".
This to me is nonsense; if Reggie hadn't made 10 of 14, then shot #15
wouldn't have mattered.
And for the record, the shots that go in are the ones that count.

When players do better in the postseason than in the regular season,
they could be said to be clutch.  Bill Russell, Michael Jordan,
Hakeem Olajuwon always did better in the postseason, in spite of
increased competition and pressure.  Wilt, Oscar, and the Mailman
always did worse.

By this standard, "clutch" is certainly measurable.  But there will
always be a place for opinion.

Just a note... I always like to do a very simple comparison; playoff numbers
vs. regular season numbers. If a player can put up the same numbers, or
better he's clutch. Generally I allow about 5% difference for FG% because
'FG%s go wayyyy down.

~Ray

> "Clutch" play by a team is often reflected in the percent of close
> games they win.

Actually, at least in baseball and the WNBA, this has not proven to be the
case. Generally speaking, bad teams win more close games than any other kind
and good teams win fewer close games than any other kind.

The reason is that bad teams don't win too many games that aren't close. Bad
teams, pretty much by definition, aren't going to blow out better teams.
They're going to play over their heads, while the better team plays below
expectations resulting in a close win for the bad team.

Good teams, on the other hand, routinely blow out their opponents, and
engage in many  mor eblot-outs throughout the course of a season than close
games.

This is not to say that bad teams have better winning percentages in close
games than good teams, although there are a number of instances where this
is the case. Last season in the WNBA, the Detroit Shock was 10-22 and 4-4 in
games decided by three points or less. Sacramento was 20-12 and 3-3 in games
decided by three points or less. Drawing the conclusion that both Detroit
and Sacramento are both equally good teams "in the clutch" is inapproriate,
in my opinion. Or, if it does mean that both teams are equally good "in the
clutch," then perhaps having a good clutch team isn't all that important.

Also in the WNBA last season, the Portland Fire were 10-22 on the year, but
4-1 in overtime games. I would imagine that overtime is a decent barometer
of the "pucker factor" in the regular season, but if Portland is such a
clutch team, why are they only 10-22? On the other hand, Charlotte finished
18-14 on the season and advanced to the WNBA Finals but was 0-3 in overtime
games during the regular season.

I'm obviously cherry-picking here, but to say that "clutch" play by a team
is often reflected in the percent of close games it wins isn't supported by
the facts.

Here's a link to a baseball study on the issue
http://www.baseballstuff.com/btf/scholars/ruane/articles/onerun.htm

With regards to players, I looked at Yolanda Griffith and Lisa Leslie last
year and how they performed "in the clutch" to back up my opinion that
Griffith, and not Leslie, should have been the league MVP. I defined "in the
clutch" as being any time in the last 5 minutes of a game where the teams
were separated by no more than 5 points. Admittedly it was pretty arbitrary,
but as you all have discussed, defining "clutch" performance is one of the
larger stumbling block to determining if the ability to perform "in the
clutch" exists.

The first item of note from my study was that out of a possible 185 minutes
for Leslie and 190 for Griffith each played just shy of 80 minutes worth of
"clutch" time. That's two full games in the WNBA. Is that enough of a sample
size, 80 minutes, to be able to determine a player's ability "in the
clutch?" I don't know.

Anyway, Leslie's field goal percentage dropped 140 points "in the clutch"
while Griffith dropped 174. Leslie's rebound average dropped by two, her
assist and blocked shots averages were down slightly, while she increased
her steals average by half a point and decreased her turnover rate from 3.1
to 1.7. Her scoring average decreased by two. She doubled her trips to the
free throw line, but her percentage fell 100 points.

Griffith's rebound average dropped half a board, her assists remained
constant, she blocked no shots during this time (blocking 37 during the rest
of the season) while she picked up an extra half of a steal and decreased
her turnover rate from 2.34 to 1.28. Her scoring average decreased by more
than five points. Her trips to the free throw line decreased slightly, but
she hit essentially the same percentage.

So what does that all mean? I haven't a clue. My gut tells me that the
sample size is just too small to mean anything with regards to most of these
numbers. And while the drop in field goal percentage is alarming, it may
simply have to do with a difference in the way the opposition is defending
these two players. Then again, it might be because these two, as go-to
players, expect to take the shots at the end of the game and tend to force
them as a result.

I forget if it was Bill James, Rob Neyer or another Sabermetrician who did a
study into "clutch" hitting in baseball players using whatever the
definition in is for close and late situations -- something like after the
7th inning down two runs or less. What they found during the years they
studied (1980s) was players like Dane Iorg throughout the top-ten in batting
average in these situations. They also found that there was no consistency
with regards to these batting averages from year to year, leading them to
conclude that "clutch" hitting was not an actual ability. While "clutch"
performances exist, the idea that players have the ability to consistently
perform above expectations "in the clutch" has yet to be proven.

Just found the Rob Neyer article about which I was thinking.
http://www.diamond-mind.com/articles/neyerclutch.htm

John Maxwell
Director of Public Relations
Charlotte Sting

--- John Maxwell <John.Maxwell@...>
wrote:
> > "Clutch" play by a team is often reflected in the
> percent of close
> > games they win.
>
> Actually, at least in baseball and the WNBA, this
> has not proven to be the
> case. Generally speaking, bad teams win more close
> games than any other kind
> and good teams win fewer close games than any other
> kind.
>
Not only that, baseball teams with a good winning pct.
in one-run games generally decline the following
season (as myself and several other White Sox fans
found out this past summer). I suspect the same is
true in the NBA, though I have never looked at the
subject, nor am I aware of anyone who has.

I would have no idea how to analyze which players are
clutch and which ones aren't. Basketball isn't like
baseball where you can just look at what each player
does in each AB and go from there. In basketball
there's defense, rebounding and passing going on in
addition to shooting. Those things would have to be
looked at also, once clutch situations were defined.

I've always felt "clutch" was one of those terms
people used to describe players they wanted to like.
Jerry West was called Mr. Clutch, despite being on the
losing team in eight NBA finals and winning only once.
This isn't to say West wasn't a clutch player. I just
wonder why West got tagged with Mr. Clutch, when it
was Bill Russell who was the biggest winner of that
time. Probably a racial thing.


Ed


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On Sat, 1 Dec 2001, Ed Weiland wrote:

> Not only that, baseball teams with a good winning pct.
> in one-run games generally decline the following
> season (as myself and several other White Sox fans
> found out this past summer). I suspect the same is
> true in the NBA, though I have never looked at the
> subject, nor am I aware of anyone who has.

I agree 100% with the statements that it is a mistake to look at teams'
records in close games, and to try to call the ones with good records
"clutch".

A minor quibble with the argument above however:  while it is indeed true
that baseball teams with a good winning pct. in one-run games can be
expected to decline the following season, the same is true of ANY team in
ANY sport in ANY sort of games.  Bill James many years ago thought he'd
discovered some profound truth in this and dreamt up some corny name for
it -- "The Law of Elastic Reboound" or something -- but it's been known
for about a century in statistics as "regression to the mean".

A team which wins 72 games in an NBA season is EXTREMELY likely to have
fewer wins the following season.  A team which wins 90% of its 1-point
games in a season is extremely likely to win a lower percentage the
following season.  A team which wins 70% of its 1-point games is very
likely to win a lower pct. the following season.  Etc.

So while I agree 100% with both of the statements (that teams' 1-run
records have little meaning, except of course to contribute to their
win-loss record; and that teams with good 1-run records are likely to see
a decline in those records the following season), it is not the case that
the latter statement is evidence in favor of the former statement.

> I would have no idea how to analyze which players are
> clutch and which ones aren't. Basketball isn't like
> baseball where you can just look at what each player
> does in each AB and go from there. In basketball
> there's defense, rebounding and passing going on in
> addition to shooting. Those things would have to be
> looked at also, once clutch situations were defined.

True enough if we're looking for "total clutchness" but most of the NBA
players who are known as clutch are known for being clutch as shooters
during crunch time.  Maybe once in a very long while they'll get a
reputation for good D in crunch time (Havlicek steals the ball, Bird
steals the ball), and I can't think of a single player who had a
reputation as a  clutch rebounder.  Maybe, say, Wilt, Russell, Silas, et
al -- but they were simply known as great rebounders period, it's not as
if people thought they only grabbed rebounds during crunch time and
lollygagged the rest of the game.

So to look for clutch players, I think it's an easy step to limit the
search to being a search for clutch *shooters*, and that is a more
limited, specific, easy-to-define concept.

> I've always felt "clutch" was one of those terms
> people used to describe players they wanted to like.
> Jerry West was called Mr. Clutch, despite being on the
> losing team in eight NBA finals and winning only once.
> This isn't to say West wasn't a clutch player. I just
> wonder why West got tagged with Mr. Clutch, when it
> was Bill Russell who was the biggest winner of that
> time. Probably a racial thing.

I agree with this also, although I would add the following hypothesis:
some players are given (or demand) the ball a lot in clutch situations.
And they thus shoot a lot of those crucial shots.  I have no idea if some
players have a systematically higher probability of making those shots,
but if they take enough of them, some of them will go in.  And people will
remember those, and tend to forget the shots that they missed.  And that
will lead to the player getting a clutch reputation.

E.g. maybe Jerry West shot in his career 100 clutch shots, and made 47 of
them.  That'd be identical to his career shooting percentage (both regular
season and playoff).  So unless there's a tendency for clutch shots to
have a lower percentage overall (which actually might be the case), Jerry
West shot no better in clutch situations than in non-clutch.  But
sportswriters, fans, and coaches would remember those 47 clutch shots
made, whereas maybe Wilt only made 15 and Gail Goodrich only made 8, and
thus Jerry West would get the reputation as Mr. Clutch.

I would add that the notion that Mike Goodman and others have advocated,
of looking at playoff games as clutch situations, is I think a good one,
and the fact that West's FG% was as high in the playoffs as it was in the
regular season is in itself a fairly remarkable, one might even say
clutch, performance.  Especially given that his scoring per game INCRASED.


--MKT

--- "Michael K. Tamada" <tamada@...> wrote:
>
> I would add that the notion that Mike Goodman and
> others have advocated,
> of looking at playoff games as clutch situations, is
> I think a good one,
> and the fact that West's FG% was as high in the
> playoffs as it was in the
> regular season is in itself a fairly remarkable, one
> might even say
> clutch, performance.  Especially given that his
> scoring per game INCRASED.


Increased shooting could also be a case of a player
trying to shoulder too much of the load. It's
interesting that in West's case the season his team
finally broke through and won the championship, 1972,
was the only year he averaged fewer points in the
playoffs than the regular season. West also shot only
.376 during the 1972 playoffs, by far the worst
showing of his career. He did post a career playoff
high in assists per game during the '72 playoffs.

Here are some other championship performances:

Wilt in '67 averaged a then career-low 21.7 ppg in the
playoffs, shot 104 points below his regular season FG
pct. (albeit a more-than-adequate .579), but posted a
career high with 9.0 assists per game.

Hakeem in '94 and '95 had FG pct. similar to his
regular season and career totals, but posted two of
his three highest playoff assist per game totals, 4.5
and 4.3 apg, both well above his career playoff
average of 3.3. Hakeem scored 33.0 ppg in the '95
playoffs, so it's not like he was sacrificing his
shots.

I'm not sure if the spike in assists is most
responsible for the championships, but I don't think
it can be ignored. Especially considering that star
players who aren't point guards, but possessed
good-to-great passing skills like Russell, Barry,
Walton,  Bird and Jordan tended to win championships.
Sometimes the the most clutch thing for a player to do
is to get his teammates involved.

btw, I don't mean to knock West as non-clutch. HIs
Laker teams lost three game sevens to the Celtics by a
total of seven points. There had to be some bad luck
involved in all that.

Ed Weiland

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When considering clutch it seems weird to think about players
actually improving over how they would in normal (nonpressure)
situations.  Rather, it seems to me that we might better define
clutch by looking at who did not become worse in clutch situations.
How you define clutch situations, incidentally, is a question I can't
really answer.

--- In APBR_analysis@y..., Ed Weiland <weiland1029@y...> wrote:
>
> --- "Michael K. Tamada" <tamada@o...> wrote:
> >
> > I would add that the notion that Mike Goodman and
> > others have advocated,
> > of looking at playoff games as clutch situations, is
> > I think a good one,
> > and the fact that West's FG% was as high in the
> > playoffs as it was in the
> > regular season is in itself a fairly remarkable, one
> > might even say
> > clutch, performance.  Especially given that his
> > scoring per game INCRASED.
>
>
> Increased shooting could also be a case of a player
> trying to shoulder too much of the load. It's
> interesting that in West's case the season his team
> finally broke through and won the championship, 1972,
> was the only year he averaged fewer points in the
> playoffs than the regular season. West also shot only
> .376 during the 1972 playoffs, by far the worst
> showing of his career. He did post a career playoff
> high in assists per game during the '72 playoffs.
>
> Here are some other championship performances:
>
> Wilt in '67 averaged a then career-low 21.7 ppg in the
> playoffs, shot 104 points below his regular season FG
> pct. (albeit a more-than-adequate .579), but posted a
> career high with 9.0 assists per game.
>
> Hakeem in '94 and '95 had FG pct. similar to his
> regular season and career totals, but posted two of
> his three highest playoff assist per game totals, 4.5
> and 4.3 apg, both well above his career playoff
> average of 3.3. Hakeem scored 33.0 ppg in the '95
> playoffs, so it's not like he was sacrificing his
> shots.
>
> I'm not sure if the spike in assists is most
> responsible for the championships, but I don't think
> it can be ignored. Especially considering that star
> players who aren't point guards, but possessed
> good-to-great passing skills like Russell, Barry,
> Walton,  Bird and Jordan tended to win championships.
> Sometimes the the most clutch thing for a player to do
> is to get his teammates involved.
>
> btw, I don't mean to knock West as non-clutch. HIs
> Laker teams lost three game sevens to the Celtics by a
> total of seven points. There had to be some bad luck
> involved in all that.
>
> Ed Weiland
>
> __________________________________________________
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> Buy the perfect holiday gifts at Yahoo! Shopping.
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Taking my list of the 515 'most productive' players of all time, I
find the following breakdown for career Playoff/Regular Season
production rate:

PO/RS   #  % of T
1.10+   17  .034
1.05+   51  .100
1.00+  134  .264
  .95+  263  .518

So, only 26.4% of all players actually improve their production in
the playoffs, and only 10% improve by as much as 5%.

The median ratio is .947.

The breakdown continues as such:
PO/RS   #  % of T
  .95-  244  .482
  .90-  131  .258
  .85-   57  .112
  .80-   35  .069
  .75-   17  .034

So a player who picks up his game by as much as 10% is as rare as a
player who's game diminishes by 25%.

( 8 of the 515 have no playoff appearances)

It seems that we could compare playoff production against the median
of .947 production, to get an idea of playoff over/under-
achievement.  Actually, I think I did that once, and for player
careers, you still get some irregularities, such as Bill Cartwright,
who played most of his playoff minutes well past his prime, etc.  So,
a season-by-season analysis might be in order.

--- In APBR_analysis@y..., bchaikin@a... wrote:
>
> i also don't know exactly what most people mean by "clutch", but
i've found
> better overall playoff performance versus regular season
performance a good
> criteria. a player can always "...take a night off..." during the
regular
> season, but in the playoffs that can mean suicide. thus if a
player's overall
> per minute numbers are better in the playoffs, plus their shooting
> percentages, to me that means he's a clutch player...
>
> bob chaikin
> bchaikin@b...

I haven't read it, but I've been getting referred to work like this
for a little while.  The "Economics of Sports" textbook may be of
interest to other people here.  A website with info is

http://www.aw.com/info/leeds_vonallmen/book.html

Dean Oliver
Journal of Basketball Studies

--- In APBR_analysis@y..., "McKibbin, Stuart" <smckibbi@c...> wrote:
> I'm charting 5 categories of stats: 1) Offensive rebounds, putbacks
by the
> rebounder and second chance points. I do not count recovering a
blocked shot
> as an offensive rebound. 2) In-the-act FTA's, technical FTA's, and-
1 FTA's,
> bonus FTA's, and threepoint FTA's. 3) Steals, fastbreak attempts
off steals,
> fastbreak points off steals 4) Blocked shots, who recovers them,
fastbreak
> attempts off blocks, points off blocks 5) Offensive fouls
>
> First, apparently I undercount steals and blocks. In the games I've
charted,
> the boxscores say the Lakes had 123 steals and 115 blocks, and the
opponent
> 104 steals and 66 blocks. My numbers are Lakers 109 steals and 86
blocks,
> opponents 86 steals and 45 blocks. I only catch about 72% of the
blocks and
> 86% of the steals. It's a fast paced game, and little tip blocks in
traffic
> are hard to pickup on, but I didn't think my numbers were THAT bad.
Of
> course, it could simply be that the official scorekeepers are
especially
> liberal in handing out gold stars. One question: Because my numbers
are so
> far off does that limit the usefulness of my stats?
>

Good luck replicating NBA numbers.  Their scorers are quite arbitrary
in awarding steals and blocks.  As an example, the Toronto block
shot "record" was rescinded a few days later when people questioned
it.  A lot of steals and blocks are awarded without any logic I see.
I tend to undercount them as well.

Does this affect the usefulness?  Yes, somewhat.  For instance, if
your analysis says, for example, that 80 steals lead to 100 points
and we then say that a steal increases offensive efficiency to
approximately 1.25 pts/poss, but the league actually recorded 100
steals, the conclusion is clouded.  If we go to use the overcounted
NBA numbers, we could easily be overstating the value of an NBA-
official steal.

> Some preliminary numbers from the 14 games. Lakers 109 steals, 67
fastbreak
> attempts, 83 points. Opponents 86 steals, 59 fastbreak attempts, 82
points.
> So if we assume the teams averaged 1 point for each non-fastbreak
attempt
> steal that means Lakes 109 steals, 125 points; opponents 86 steals,
109
> points. Totals: 195 steals, 234 points or 1.2 points per steal. I
realize we
> can't extrapolate this to the league at large (Laker games may not
be
> representative) but it is interesting.
>

Would be nice if you didn't assume 1 pt for non-fastbreak attempts.
Also note that if you use the official count on steals, you have 227
steals and your estimate of 234 points off of it -- pretty close to 1
pt/assist.  That's where the potential undercounting is a problem.
Maybe "true" steals are worth 1.2 pts, but NBA official steals may be
worth only about 1 pt.

> Blocks: I counted 131 blocks for the games, the shooting team
recovered 56
> of them. So a block deprived the offense of the ball just 57% of
the time.
> Moreover, those 75 defensive recoveries resulted in very few
fastbreak
> attempts yielding just 33 points. It seems the blocked shot isn't
much of a
> fastbreak starter.
>

Good info.  A blocked shot is primarily a defensive contribution.

> Offensive rebounds: My numbers matchup with the boxscores pretty
well (once
> you add in the offensive recovery of blocked shots).  What is
amazing is how
> much better the Lakers are than their opponents at the rebounder
sticking
> the ball back in the hole. Lakers 150 off rebs (plus 6 off team
rebs), 72
> shots by the rebounder, 48 putback baskets. Overall 176 points from
the 156
> second chance opportunities. The opponents had 156 off rebs (plus
11 off
> team rebs) 75 shots by rebounder, but only 29 putback baskets.
Overall 161
> points in 167 second chance opportunities.
>

Hmmm.  Mixed results.  I have generally done incomplete looks at the
issue and almost always with _good_ teams.  Those good teams suggest
that scoring off an offensive rebound is a little more efficient than
scoring in general.  Maybe it ain't true with mediocre or poor teams.

Useful to know that approximately 1/2 of all offensive rebounds are
shot by the rebounder.  I can definitely use that.  I've always
assumed 1/5th would be, knowing that it doesn't make a huge
difference to my analysis.  I need to review this stuff a little
later to see how it all adds up.

> Last thought, the following stats show how unique and outstanding a
player
> Shaquille O'Neal is:  54 off rebs, 33 putback shots by him making
24 (73%).
> He personally scored 57 points directly after his grabbing the
rebound, his
> teammates chipping in for another 12 points.  In the 14 games, I
charted
> 27(!) of his FTA's as "and-1's" (17.4% of the 155 FTA's he shot in
those 14
> games), the next highest on the Lakers is Kobe with 7.

I estimate total possessions from free throws as 0.4 * FTA.  So
0.4*155 = 62 total possessions from his free throws.  The "and 1's"
do not count as a possession, which is why I use 0.4, not 0.48 or
something closer to 0.5 (which would account only for technical
fouls).  From your numbers, 155-27 = 128.  128 foul attempts on two-
shot fouls means 64 possessions.  So I'm off by 2 possessions, which
could be some of the technical fouls shot by the Lakers.

Let me take a guess then at how many FTA's Kobe had:

(x-7)/2 ~ 0.4x

x ~ 35

That is very low, knowing that he has shot 144 in 16 games.
He "should have" shot many more "and-1's", probably on the order of
20.  The person who should have the next most and-1's is Devean
George or Robert Horry, with maybe 4-5.

How many total "and-1's" have their been for the Laker team?  How
many total technical foul shots for the team?

I need to check to see how variation from the 0.4 would affect my
offensive efficiency ratings.  I think your info slightly raises
Kobe's pts produced, his scoring possessions, and his total
possessions.  So, it would slightly help my calculated numbers for
him.


For some of you that
> calculate offensive efficiency, that helps him, right? He had 37
personal
> fouls in the 14 charted games, 9 are offensive (24.3%). For those
of you
> that calculate defensive efficiency, that helps, too, right?
>

Keep counting.  If 25% of all fouls are offensive, that is a useful
piece of knowledge.  Or if it's 20-30%, that helps.

OK its almost been a quarter of the season. Almost anybody got a
favorite for rookie of the year yet?

I only ask because it seems no one paid attention last year until it
was time to vote. Then again, there weren't very many obvious choices.

Here are a few notes and baubles.

Week one and everyone and their mother has crowned Joe Johnson ROY. I
like him, steady, defensive minded, passes the ball. Seems to have
faded as of late.

Since then Tinsley & Parker have been thrust into the upper echelon
not just of rookie candidates, but of the league. Triple doubles, 20+
assist games, and replacing incumbent veterans will do that for you.

And then we have my pick...
Pau Gasol.
Pau Gasol?!
I know.

He may play on a bad team but someone has to produce right?
Here's a little food for thought. Aside from playing for one of the
worst teams in the league; he leads his team and all rookies in
scoring, is tops in rookie RPG, is top ten in blocked shots in the
league and is top 20 in FTA. IN FTA! He's shot more FTs than Jordan,
how is that? Okay, 4 more ATT than Jordan. But you see my point.
So Pau is my dark horse.
It's a long season though. It should be interesting to see who "pan's
out" this year.

Anyone else got any favorites?